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SELECTED LEGISLATION OF THE
1979 REGULAR SESSION-A
STUDENT COMMENTARY*
[Editor's note. This commentary does not purport to be a compre-
hensive study of the 1979 legislation; rather, the articles treat only
selected statutes enacted during the past legislative session.]
CRIMINAL LAW
HARMLESS ERROR
Act 86 of 1979 amends Code of Criminal Procedure article 921,
which contains Louisiana's "harmless error" rule, to read: "A judg-
ment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because
of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect
substantial rights of the accused." Prior to its amendment, article
921 provided:
A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court
on any ground unless in the opinion of the court after an exami-
nation of the entire record, it appears that the error complained
of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the accused, or constitutes a substan-
tial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.
The catalyst of this amendment was the Louisiana Supreme
Court's statement in State v. Herman' that article 921 precluded the
court from looking "behind the substantial violation of the constitu-
*tional rights of the accused to determine if other evidence over-
whelmingly indicates his guilt."2 Proponents of Act 86 contend that
article 921 as amended allows the appellate court to affirm when
*The student authors of the Legislative Commentary are Allen M. Posey, Jr.,
author of the Criminal Law section, and Gordon Terry Whitman, author of the Civil
Law section.
1. 304 So. 2d 322 (La. 1974).
2. Id. at 325. Representative Emile "Peppi" Bruneau, co-author of Senate Bill No.
247 (Act 86), cited this language from Herman in his testimony before the House
Criminal Justice Committee on May 30, 1979. The same language was cited by Norble
Rose, President of the Louisiana District Attorney's Association, to the Senate Judi-
ciary C Committee at a hearing on May 15, 1979. Proponents of the bill, including
Senator Fritz Windhorst, its lead author, Harry Connick, Orleans Parish District
Attorney, and John Mamoulides, Jefferson Parish District Attorney, all voiced concern
that the convictions of many defendants were being overturned because of some error
committed at the trial, even where other evidence overwhelmingly indicated the defen-
dant's guilt.
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overwhelming evidence of guilt exists, thus aligning Louisiana's
harmless error rule with that of the majority of other states and
with the federal jurisprudence.' An understanding of the probable
effects of this Act requires an examination of both the federal and
the Louisiana harmless error rules.4
The federal statutory harmless error rules provide that errors
or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties
are to be disregarded.' In an exhaustive analysis of the federal
statutory harmless error rule,' the United States Supreme Court in
Kotteakos v. United States7 concluded that if, after examining the
proceedings in their entirety, the court "is sure that the error did
not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and
the judgment should stand, except where the departure is from a
constitutional norm or a specific command from Congress."8 Subse-
quently, in Fahy v. Connecticut9 and Chapman v. California," the
Supreme Court expanded the scope of the harmless error doctrine
by indicating that the doctrine may be applicable to some errors of
constitutional dimension. In Fahy the Court determined the test for
3. At the May 30th House Criminal Justice Committee meeting, Representative
Bruneau testified that this bill was an adoption of the "overwhelming-evidence" test
used by the majority of other jurisdictions and by the federal courts. The same testi-
mony as to the bill's effect was given in the Judiciary C Committee hearing on May
15th by Connick, Rose, and Pete Adams, Executive Director of the Louisiana District
Attorney's Association. The proponents of the bill, however, apparently misinter-
preted the rationale underlying the decision in Herman. The Herman court was unable
to follow the federal rule due to Louisiana's constitutional prohibition against review of
facts in criminal cases. Thus, the legislature did not have the power to alter the court's
decision in Herman by amending article 921. See text at note 21, infra.
4. For an excellent discussion of harmless constitutional error in the federal
courts and in Louisiana, see Comment, Harmless Constitutional Error-A Louisiana
Dilemma?, 33 LA. L. REV. 82 (1972).
5. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1949 provides: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of cer-
tiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties."
FED. R. EVID. 103(a) provides in pertinent part: "Error may not be predicated upon
a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected ...." Additionally, the trial court must be properly made aware of the error.
FED. R. EvID. 103(a)(2).
6. The statute interpreted by the Court was the predecessor to rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See note 5, supra.
7. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
8. Id. at 764. The Court thus implied that harmless error may not exist where
the error violated a constitutional or statutory right.
9. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
10. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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reversal to be "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. To
decide this question, it is necessary to review the facts of the case
and the evidence adduced at trial."" The Chapman Court held "that
before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."'2 The development of federal harmless constitu-
tional error rules culminated in Harrington v. California,'3 in which
the Court found harmless a violation of the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right of confrontation" given the overwhelming evidence
against him. 5
The focal point in an examination of Louisiana's harmless error
doctrine is State v. Michelli.'" In Miche li the defendant sought a
reversal of his burglary conviction based upon the admission into
evidence at defendant's trial of a statement of a co-participant.
Recognizing that in a federal case such a violation might be held
harmless if other evidence overwhelmingly indicated the guilt of the
accused, the court stated that this was not the rule in Louisiana. In-
terpreting article 921, the court held that if a violation of a constitu-
tional or statutory right exists, the court must fulfill "its historic
appellate function and reverse, ordering a new trial."" The court in-
dicated that it was unable to apply the federal rule since the Loui-
siana bill of exceptions procedure' 8 did not provide for a mechanism
11. 375 U.S. at 86-87.
12. 386 U.S. at 24.
13. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
14. The specific constitutional error found harmless by the Court in Harrington
was a violation of the "Bruton doctrine," first enunciated by the Court in Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). This doctrine provides that a defendant's right of
cross-examination, secured by the sixth amendment's confrontation clause, is violated
if, at his joint trial with a co-defendant who does not testify, the co-defendant's confes-
sion incriminating the accused is admitted into evidence. The violation occurs notwith-
standing jury instructions to the effect that the co-defendant's confession must be
disregarded in determining the accused's guilt or innocence.
15. 395 U.S. at 254.
16. 301 So. 2d 577 (La. 1974).
17. Id. at 580-81.
18. Prior to 1974, no error or irregularity in the proceedings could be challenged
after the verdict unless a contemporaneous objection was made and a formal bill of ex-
ceptions reserved. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841 (as it appeared prior to 1974 La. Acts,
No. 207). "When a bill of exceptions [was] reserved, the clerk or court stenographer
would immediately take down the objection, the ruling, and the facts upon which the
objection [was] based." LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 843 (as it appeared prior to 1974 La.
Acts, No. 207). It was then necessary that the bills of exception reserved during the
trial be submitted to the court and signed by the trial judge prior to the granting of an
order of appeal. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 845 (as it appeared prior to 1974 La. Acts, No.
207). Generally, the appellate court could consider only bills signed by the trial judge
19801 .439
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by which the entire record could be brought before the court. In a
footnote, the court justified its holding by noting that its juris-
diction extended only to questions of law and, consequently, it was
prohibited from evaluating the evidence. 9 Although the bill of ex-
ceptions procedure was subsequently abolished," the court's decision
in Herman reiterated that its inability to consider other "over-
whelming evidence" against the accused resulted from a lack of




If the Louisiana Supreme Court is in fact unable under the state
constitution to apply the federal rule, a dilemma is created,22 since
the United States Supreme Court held in Chapman that where
federal constitutional error is at issue, state courts must apply the
federal rule. 23 Given that the Louisiana court is unable to apply the
federal rule by reviewing the facts, it would seem the only alter-
native left to the Louisiana court is reversal of the conviction in any
case in which the lower court erred with respect to a federal con-
stitutional right.2 This dilemma, however, is a fleeting one; an
examination of the harmless error doctrine both before and after
Michelli reveals practices inconsistent with that language of the
Michelli and Herman cases in which the court had indicated that it
is prevented by the Louisiana constitution25 from looking to other
overwhelming evidence against the accused when evaluating error.
in conformity with the above article. Those bills contained "only the evidence neces-
sary to form a basis for the bill .... LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 844 (as it appeared prior
to 1974 La. Acts, No. 207). Although the accused had the right to have all the testi-
mony of the witnesses on the question of guilt or innocence made a part of the tran-
script on appeal, that testimony could be considered only to explain the formal bills of
exception. LA. R.S. 15:291 (1950). The bill of exceptions procedure was abolished in
1974, and now all that is required is a contemporaneous objection. LA. CODE CRIM. P.
art. 841, as amended by 1974 La. Acts, No. 207. For criticism of the former bill of ex-
ceptions procedure, see State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017, 245 So. 2d 159, appeal dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 931 (1971); Note, Criminal Procedure-Appellate Review-Failure to
Perfect Bill of Exceptions Bars Review of Trial Error, 46 TUL. L. REV. 1009 (1972).
19. 301 So. 2d at 580 n.7.
20. 1974 La. Acts, No. 207. See note 18, supra. For a discussion of some of the
changes effectuated by this Act, see Highlights of the 1974 Regular Session, 35 LA. L.
REV. 597, 597-601 (1975).
21. 304 So. 2d at 325.
22. See Comment, supra note 4, at 90.
23. 386 U.S. at 21.
24. But see State v. Hills, 259 La. 436, 250 So. 2d 395 (1971). In Hills, the court did
not reverse the defendant's aggravated rape conviction; it held that the introduction of
evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment was harmless error under the
Harrington rule. Id at 453-54, 250 So. 2d at 400-01.
25. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(C) provides: "[Tlhe jurisdiction of the supreme court in
civil cases extends to both law and facts. In criminal matters, its appellate jurisdiction
extends only to questions of law." The 1921 constitution contained a similar provision.
LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10, para. 3 (1921, repealed 1974).
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With regard to harmless error, the Miche li majority stated that
"[t]he Louisiana statutory rule has remained the same through the
years .. 2 The court failed to note, however, that the application
of that rule as judicially administered had often varied significantly
from that espoused in the Michelli decision. On at least four occa-
sions in the five years preceding Michelli, the Louisiana Supreme
Court was influenced by other independent evidence in the trial
record in its application of the harmless error statute.27
Subsequent to the acknowledgment by the Michelli court of its
inability to review the facts or weigh the evidence in a criminal
case, inconsistent decisions involving harmless error and review-of-
26. 301 So. 2d at 580.
27. In State v. Hills, 259 La. 436, 250 So. 2d 394 (1971), the court, in reviewing the
defendant's aggravated rape conviction, held that the introduction of an illegally seized
jacket of an alleged victim in another similar offense by the defendant was harmless
error under the Harrington rule (the error was harmless because the evidence against
the defendant was overwhelming).
In State v. Mixon, 258 La. 835, 248 So. 2d 307 (1971), the court, in reviewing the
defendant's armed robbery conviction, found that the introduction of evidence of an
identification of the defendant made at a lineup not attended by the defense counsel
was not reversible error. The court, after a review of the testimony as a whole, rea-
soned that such evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Chapman
rule.
In State v. MacGregor, 257 La. 956, 244 So. 2d 846 (1971), the court addressed a
non-constitutional error committed during defendant's trial. The prosecutor in his clos-
ing argument referred to the defendant as an "unpredictable animal" and made other
somewhat prejudicial remarks. The supreme court held the error to be harmless under
the Harrington overwhelming-evidence-of-guilt test. However, Justice Barham in a con-
currence pointed out that the court should not have applied that test since only the
following evidence was before the supreme court: the prosecutor's statement during
argument; defense counsel's objection; the court's ruling; the court's admonition to the
jury; and the trial court's per curiam, which simply concluded that the remark was
harmless because there was sufficient evidence to convict. 257 La. at 963, 244 So. 2d at
848 (Barham, J., concurring).
In State v. Hopper, 253 La. 439, 218 So. 2d 551 (1969), on remand from 392 U.S. 658
(1968), the confessions of two co-defendants had been admitted at their joint homicide
trial in violation of the Bruton doctrine. See note 14, supra. The court, however, found
that in the context of the circumstances presented, the error constituted only a tech-
nical violation of the defendant's rights.
We have assiduously examined this case from all aspects and are persuaded
that the joint trial of the defendants has been fair in every respect. In fine, defen-
dants have no defense; in concert they committed a vicious crime to which they
separately and voluntarily confessed their guilt in detailed statements inculpating
each other.
253 La. at 440, 218 So. 2d at 555. While the court mentioned neither the Chapman rule
nor the constitutional prohibition against appellate review of fact, see note 25, supra,
and accompanying text, such a conclusion could not have been drawn without an ex-
amination of evidence independent of the admission of each co-defendant's confession.
Indeed, a reading of the case reveals that the writers of both the majority and dissent-
ing opinions reviewed the evidence in detail in reaching their respective conclusions.
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fact have been rendered. While the Michelli rule has often been
followed," many decisions which cite Michelli as controlling have
pointed out that the record would not support an application of the
federal harmless error doctrine in any event since the evidence
against the defendant was not overwhelming. 9 Still other cases have
applied the Harrington overwhelming-proof-of-guilt test" or some
other test which entails a review of the entire record." In none of
the cases in these latter two categories, however, has the court men-
tioned the applicability of the present constitutional prohibition
against appellate review of facts in criminal cases.32
28. See State v. Lemelle, 353 So. 2d 1312 (La. 1978); State v. Green, 315 So. 2d
763 (La. 1975); State v. McCully, 310 So. 2d 833 (La. 1975); State v. Murphy, 309 So. 2d
134 (La. 1975); State v. Moore, 305 So. 2d 532 (La. 1975); State v. Herman, 304 So. 2d
322 (La. 1974).
29. See, e.g., State v. Green, 315 So. 2d 763 (La. 1975); State v, Murphy, 309 So.
2d 134 (La. 1975); State v. Moore, 305 So. 2d 532 (La. 1975).
30. In State v. Berain, 360 So. 2d 822, 830 (La. 1978), the court concluded that
prejudicial statements of the prosecutor in his closing argument "did not contribute to
the verdict: the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming-including his own ad-
mission of the misconduct charged ...." In State v. Meunier, 354 So. 2d 535 (La. 1978),
the defendant was convicted of making abusive telephone communications. Although
the trial court admitted evidence of telephone calls outside the period charged in the
bill of information, the court held the error to be harmless, partly because of the over-
whelming evidence of telephone calls within the specified period. In State v. Williams,
347 So. 2d 184, 187 (La. 1977), the trial court's failure to identify the confidential infor-
mant who was a participant in the unlawful drug sale for which defendant was con-
victed was held to be harmless error because defendant neither alleged nor showed
that he was prejudiced by the failure and because "the proof of guilt [was] overwhelm-
ing." In State v. Ivy, 307 So. 2d 587, 592 (La. 1975), defendant objected to the state's
use of the grand jury testimony of defendant's daughter as the basis for cross-exami-
nation at trial. The court, after reviewing "the entire record made part of the bill of
exceptions number two," found this to be harmless error, since the evidence of guilt
was "overwhelming, consisting of testimony of at least seven eyewitnesses."
31. In State v. Kellogg, 350 So. 2d 656 (La. 1977), the court reversed defendant's
aggravated battery conviction because the trial court denied him the right to adduce
evidence of the filing of a civil suit by the victim-witness against the defendant; such
evidence was intended to show bias or intent on the part of the victim-witness. The
court was influenced by the fact that this was a close factual dispute and that the only
eyewitnesses were the defendant, the victim, and the victim's wife. In State v. Bean,
337 So. 2d 496, 498 (La. 1976), a state witness testified as to statements made to that
witness by an eyewitness to the effect that the defendant had stabbed the victim. The
courtheld that in light of the entire record, this constituted reversible error since the
"evidence against the defendant in this case was circumstantial."
In State v. Sockwell, 337 So. 2d 451, 454 (La. 1976), a police officer was allowed to
testify, despite timely objection, regarding what the victim of the robbery had told
him. The court held this to be harmless error because an "examination of the entire
record makes clear that the ruling has not resulted in a miscarriage of justice, prejudi-
cial to the substantial rights of the accused; nor does it constitute a substantial viola-
tion of a constitutional or statutory right."
32. Justice Barham, however, in a dissenting opinion in State v. Ivy, 307 So. 2d
587, 593 (La. 1975), indicated that the majority had applied a harmless error rule which
could not be used under Louisiana law, thus referring by implication to his dissenting
[Vol. 40
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Before proceeding to a discussion of the changes effectuated by
Act 86, one other aspect of the Michelli and Herman decisions war-
rants comment. In both decisions the court interpreted article 921 to
require a reversal where there is a substantial violation of a consti-
tutional or statutory right or where a miscarriage of justice occurs."z
The court's decision in State v. Ardoin,34 however, recognized that
the language of article 921 is "couched in the negative"; 35 "[a] judg-
ment or ruling shall not be reversed ... unless in the opinion of the
court after an examination of the entire record,"" one of the
enumerated conditions of article 921 is met. Consequently, neither
every substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right nor
every miscarriage of justice necessitates a reversal.37 The United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Chapman, of course, can be said
to have modified this rule somewhat with respect to federal consti-
tutional error whenever the Louisiana court insists that it is unable
to review the facts in criminal cases.3 8
Act 86 of 1979 should be analyzed against this background of the
federal harmless error doctrine and that of Louisiana. It appears
that the legislative intent underlying this act was to grant the Loui-
siana Supreme Court the statutory right to hold trial court errors
harmless where other evidence overwhelmingly indicates the guilt
of the accused. However, if one accepts the reasoning of the Michelli
and Herman cases, the legislature does not possess the power to
grant that right. The Michelli and Herman decisions point to the
Louisiana constitutional prohibition against appellate review of facts
in criminal cases as the barrier to the adoption of the federal over-
whelming-evidence test. If the problem lies in constitutional, rather
than in statutory provisions, then the legislature is unable to statu-
torily alter the Michelli-Herman rule.
opinion in State v. Anderson, 254 La. 1107, 1140, 229 So. 2d 329, 341 (1969), rev'd 403
U.S. 949 (1971), and his concurring opinion in State v. MacGregor, 257 La. 956, 963, 244
So. 2d 846, 848 (1971), where he discussed Louisiana's constitutional prohibition against
review of facts in criminal cases.
33. "If there is a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, there is no sug-
gestion that this court should not fulfill its historic appellate function and reverse,
ordering a new trial." State v. Michelli, 301 So. 2d at 580. "Under the Louisiana statu-
tory rule [article 921] this court must reverse the conviction if there is a substantial
violation of a constitutional right or if there is a miscarriage of justice." State v. Her-
man, 304 So. 2d at 325.
34. 340 So. 2d 1362 (La. 1976).
35. Id. at 1365.
36. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 921 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 86).
37. 340 So. 2d at 1365.
38. Since state courts are required by Chapman to apply the federal rule, which
entails a review of all the facts where federal constitutional rights are violated, see
text at notes 23-24, supra, if our state constitution precludes the application of that
federal rule, Chapman would appear to mandate a reversal.
19801
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Article V, section 5(c) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 pro-
vides: "[T]he jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases extends
to both law and facts. In criminal matters, its appellate jurisdiction
extends only to questions of law." This provision adopted from the
1921 constitution39 has traditionally been interpreted to preclude the
court's examination of the trial record to determine for itself the
sufficiency of the evidence. ° Only where no evidence existed to sup-
port an essential element of the crime was the court allowed to
reverse.41 The traditional interpretation was modified somewhat
where the issue was total lack of circumstantial evidence to prove
the crime or an essential element of it. In that instance the test
became "whether or not there is some evidence from which the trier
of fact could reasonably conclude that beyond a reasonable doubt
the accused had committed every element of the crime with which
charged."42
This traditional interpretation has now been altered by the re-
cent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v.
Virginia." In Jackson the Court held that due process requirements
of the federal Constitution mandate that the reviewing court deter-
mine at least "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt."" Two recent Louisiana Supreme Court decisions45 recognized
that the Jackson standard is applicable to the review of convictions
by the state supreme court. In State v. Matthews" the court stated
that the Jackson test may be slightly broader than the Louisiana
test when applied in reviewing convictions supported only by cir-
cumstantial evidence; according to the Matthews court, the Jackson
decision suggested "that review and reversal may be mandated
where weak direct evidence is exculpatorily explainable by the over-
whelming preponderance in the record of other evidence found
credible by the trier of fact."47 Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court
recognized that it now must examine all the facts to determine if
those facts are sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Jackson
39. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10, para. 3 (1921, repealed 1974).
40. E.g., State v. De la Beckwith, 344 So. 2d 360 (La. 1977); State v. Plummer, 281
So. 2d 716 (La. 1973).
41. E.g., State v. Tennant, 352 So. 2d 629 (La. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 945
(1978).
42. State v. Lindinger, 357 So. 2d 500, 501 (La. 1978).
43. 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
44. Id. at 2789.
45. State v. Abercrombie, No. 64,185 (La. Sept. 4, 1979); State v. Matthews, No.
64,079 (La. Sept. 4, 1979).
46. No. 64,079 (La. Sept. 4, 1979).
47. Id., slip op. at 5 (emphasis added).
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standard. Yet this appears to be exactly what the court in Michelli
and Herman8 indicated its inability to do in determining the harm-
lessness of error committed at the accused's trial.
In light of the Matthews decision and numerous other decisions
in which the court examined facts independently of the error com-
mitted,49 it must be questioned whether, in deciding whether error is
harmless, a review of all the facts is in fact proscribed by the Loui-
siana constitution. The court is continuously examining facts where
that examination is incidental to the decision of a question of law.5"
In reviewing the facts pursuant to an article 921 harmless error
determination, the court would not be substituting its judgment as
to whether the evidence sufficiently indicates the guilt of the ac-
cused for that of the trier of fact.' The inquiry instead would be
whether the jury, considering all the evidence adduced, could have
been influenced in its decision by the error committed at trial.52
Such an inquiry would seem to be within the court's jurisdiction
over "questions of law."
The writer suggests that if, in applying article 921, review of
facts is actually proscribed by the Louisiana constitution, the result
is the emasculation of the harmless error doctrine. This doctrine can
be viable and useful only if the court refutes the restrictive lan-
guage of the Michelli and Herman cases. Such a course of action is
urged; it is preferable to reject this language rather than to con-
tinue to apply the review of fact rule inconsistently and arbitrarily.
It has been suggested by an earlier writer that there exist three
alternatives in deciding whether trial court error is harmless. The
court may consider (1) all the evidence untainted by the error, (2)
only the error itself, or (3) a combination of both factors. Michelli
and Herman appear to permit only the second alternative. It is sub-
48. See text at notes 16-21, supra.
49. See notes 30-31, supra.
50. For example, the situation often arises in which improper evidence admitted
despite timely objection is held to be harmless because the same evidence had been ad-
mitted earlier at trial without objection by defense counsel. See, e.g., State v.
Williams, 347 So. 2d 214 (La. 1977); State v. McGuffey, 301 So. 2d 582 (La. 1974).
McGuffey, in fact, was decided the same day as Michelli. While the results of these
decisions do not seem offensive, to reach those results the court necessarily had to
review other facts. If the court can review a portion of the other evidence to deter-
mine whether a particular error is harmless, it should follow, a fortiori, that the entire
record can be reviewed to determine whether an error is harmless.
51. Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L.R. 814, 819
(1970).
52. This inquiry may be phrased in a variety of ways. The Fahy and Chapman
standards provide guidance. See text at notes 11-12, supra. For a thorough discussion
of the topic, see R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970).
53. Comment, supra note 4, at 85.
1980]
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mitted that a determination of the harmlessness of an error made
by considering only that error in a vacuum is an exercise in futility.
The ultimate issue is what impact, if any, the error could have had
on the fact finder. To resolve this issue with reasonable accuracy,
the court should consider what evidence was presented to the finder
of fact.
As discussed earlier, notwithstanding the MichelIi and Herman
language, the court has often looked to the other untainted evidence
in addition to the error itself to determine the harmlessness of that
error." In his majority opinion in Michelli, Justice Dixon expressed
concern that some local judges, prosecutors, and police will avoid
illegal procedures and practices only if convictions are reversed as a
result of such errors." Perhaps, then, the court's occasional refusal
to consider the entire record in order to find overwhelming evidence
of guilt is motivated by its solicitude for the rights of the accused.
The author has no quarrel with the court's use of the harmless
error rule to protect the constitutional rights of defendants and to
ensure that legal procedures are followed in the administration of
criminal justice at the local level. However, these objectives could
have been achieved by a conscientious application of article 921
rather than by a finding that reversal is mandated by the Louisiana
constitutional prohibition of review of facts in criminal cases." The
court's ambivalent attitude towards factual review in determining
harmless error should be abandoned. Such an attitude will in-
evitably foster disillusionment and an erosion of confidence in the
decisions rendered by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Criminal jus-
tice at the appellate level is better administered and the integrity of
the guilt-determination process better preserved by consistent, pre-
dictable judicial policies.
As previously indicated, the legislature's intent to adopt the
federal "overwhelming-evidence" test will not be accomplished by
the passage of Act 86 since that body cannot mandate the court's in-
terpretation of the constitutional prohibition of factual review in
criminal trials. The question remains, however, whether the Act will
effectuate any other change in the interpretation of article 921. This
answer must also be a negative one. While errors resulting in a
54. See notes 30-31, supra.
55. 301 So. 2d at 579.
56. Under the new law, the court can reverse anytime it finds substantial rights
of the accused affected. As recognized by Senator Landry at the May 15th meeting of
the Senate Judiciary C Committee, the new legislation appears to create a lesser stan-
dard than the old standard of prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused. Thus,




"miscarriage of justice" or amounting to a "substantial violation of a
constitutional or statutory right" have been deleted as grounds for
reversal under the statute, these changes will likely have little im-
pact on the present harmless error doctrine. The latter errors would
appear to be encompassed within that category of errors which "af-
fect substantial rights of the accused"; moreover, the court has
seldom reversed solely based on errors that result in a miscarriage
of justice." The deletion of a reference to an examination of the en-
tire record would also seem to be of little consequence since the
court's inherent power to exercise its jurisdiction 8 and the spirit of
article 921"9 would indicate that the court can consider as much of
the record as required to determine the harmlessness of the error.
Since it has no substantial effect on the harmless error doctrine,
Act 86 might be viewed as a message directed by the legislature to
the Louisiana Supreme Court: where the defendant is obviously guil-
ty, the best interests of the public are met by affirmance of convic-
tions, even where error exists. Given that the interpretation of the
statute is not within the ambit of the legislature's authority, the
message is at best a suggestive one.
HOMICIDE
Prior to Act 74 of 1979, first degree murder was defined as "the
killing of a human being when the offender has specific intent to kill
or inflict great bodily harm."" By contrast, the second degree
murder statute which defines Louisiana's "felony murder" required
no specific intent, but only that the offender be engaged in one of
the enumerated felonies at the time of the killing." Act 74 alters the
57. An error resulting in a "miscarriage of justice" appears to refer to the viola-
tion of some right not specifically granted by the constitution, either state or federal,
or by statute. Such a right, however, could easily be deemed to be a part of the funda-
mental right to a fair trial or an element of due process, and thus fall within the
substantial rights of the accused.
58. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 17 provides:
A court possesses inherently all powers necessary for the exercise of its juris-
diction and the enforcement of its lawful orders, including authority to issue such
writs and orders as may be necessary or proper in aid of its jurisdiction. It has
the duty to require that criminal proceedings shall be conducted with dignity and
in an orderly and expeditious manner and to so control the proceedings that
justice is done. A court has the power to punish for contempt.
59. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 3 provides: "Where no procedure is specifically pre-
scribed by this Code or by statute, the court may proceed in a manner consistent with
the spirit of the provisions of this Code and other applicable statutory and constitu-
tional provisions."
60. LA. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1976).
61. LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1978) provided:
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender is
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definitions of both crimes. First degree murder still requires specific
intent, but Act 74 imposes the additional requirement that one of
four enumerated aggravating circumstances be satisfied. 2 Felony
murder is retained as one of the bases for second degree murder,
but Act 74 adds, as an alternative basis, the killing of another with
"a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm."6 Thus, this
new alternative basis for second degree murder is identical to the
pre-Act 74 definition of first degree murder. Act 74 further amends
the second degree murder statute by increasing the applicable
penalty.6 ' A final provision of Act 74 is the addition of four ag-
gravating circumstances to be considered in the sentencing phase of
the trial of a capital offense. 5
engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggra-
vated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape,
armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or to in-
flict great bodily harm.
62. LA. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 74, § 1, pro-
vides:
First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) when the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm
and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kid-
napping, aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated rape, aggravated bur-
glary, armed robbery, or simple robbery;
(2) when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm upon a fireman or peace officer engaged in the performance of his lawful
duties;
(3) when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm upon more than one person; or
(4) when the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm
and has offered, has been offered, has given, or has received anything of value for
the killing.
63. LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1978), as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 74, § 1.
64. Prior to Act 74, the penalty for second degree murder was punishment "by
life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence"
or eligibility for parole for forty years. LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1978). Act 74 increases
the penalty by completely denying probation, parole, and suspension of sentence. This
is the same penalty which may be recommended by the jury as an alternative to the
death penalty in a first degree murder conviction. LA. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1979).
65. 1979 La. Acts, No. 74, § 2, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.4. Under the
recently adopted scheme of Louisiana's Code of Criminal Procedure, the death penalty
may be imposed only after a sentencing hearing during which the jury considers both
the aggravating and mitigating "circumstances of the offense and the character and
propensities of the offender." LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.2. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts.
905-05.9, added by 1976 La. Acts, No. 694, § 1.
Legislative revision was first initiated in response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972), which required that juries be provided guidelines to follow in order to
preclude the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death sentences. At the time Fur-
man was decided, Louisiana imposed a mandatory death sentence for murder. LA. R.S.
14:30 (1950). As a response to Furman, the legislature created two grades of murder:
first degree, 1973 La. Acts, No. 109, amending LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950); and second
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An understanding of the rationale underlying the adoption of
Act 74 is facilitated by a brief examination of prior legislation and
recent jurisprudence regarding Louisiana's homicide statutes. The
legislature in 1976 defined first degree murder as the killing of a
human being when the offender had a specific intent to kill or inflict
great bodily harm."6 Second degree murder was defined as the kill-
ing of a human being when the offender was engaged in one of
seven dangerous felonies even though he had no intent to kill.67 The
1976 legislature also provided for a sentencing hearing in capital
cases and delineated certain aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances to be considered by the jury in deciding whether the appro-
priate punishment was death or life imprisonment without benefit of
probation or parole or suspension of sentence.66
The passage of Act 121 of 1977 created an apparent flaw in the
above homicide scheme. 9 That Act added to the then-existing law
the provision that second degree murder also included the killing of
a human being when the offender had specific intent to kill, but the
killing was accomplished without any of the aggravating circum-
stances listed in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article
degree, 1973 La. Acts, No. 111, adding LA. R.S. 14:30.1. Only first degree murder was
punishable by death. See Rault, On Louisiana's New Homicide Statutes: Purpose, Con-
stitutionality and Problems of Interpretation, 19 Loy. L. REV. 563, 570-71 (1973).
Following the decision of Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), which held that
Louisiana's legislative response to Furman was constitutionally inadequate, the legisla-
ture in 1976 adopted a new scheme of first and second degree murder, 1976 La. Acts,
No. 657. The sentencing procedure was adopted for use in first degree murder cases.
Act 74 of 1979 amends article 905.4 by adding the following aggravating circumstances:
[1] [Tihe offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration
of . . .aggravated arson, aggravated escape ...or simple robbery;
[21 the offender . . . has a significant prior history of criminal activity;
[31 the victim was a witness in a prosecution against the defendant, gave
material assistance to the state in any investigation or prosecution of the defen-
dant, or was an eye witness to a crime alleged to have been committed by the
defendant or possessed other material evidence against the defendant;
[41 the victim was a correctional officer or any employee of the Louisiana
Department of Corrections who, in the normal course of his employment was re-
quired to come in close contact with persons incarcerated in a state prison facility,
and the victim was engaged in his lawful duties at the time of the offense.
66. 1976 La. Acts, No. 657, amending LA. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1975).
67. 1976 La. Acts, No. 657, amending LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1975).
68. 1976 La. Acts, No. 694, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 905-05.9. See note 65,
supra.
69. 1977 La. Acts, No. 121, amending LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1976). The passage of
Act 121 was apparently precipitated by the feeling that in murder cases devoid of ag-
gravating circumstances, some means of facilitating plea bargains, convictions, and
sentencing were necessary. It was also felt that not all persons convicted of first
degree murder should be subjected to a capital sentencing hearing. See State v.
Payton, 361 So. 2d 866, 869 (La. 1978).
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905.4." The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Payton," referring
to Act 121 of 1977, stated:
By defining second degree murder as an unaggravated,
specific intent homicide, the legislature clearly intended by im-
plication to remove this type of conduct from the definition of
first degree murder and to redefine the capital offense as a
specific intent homicide accomplished with a statutorily pre-
scribed aggravating circumstance. 2
The court concluded that the result of the 1977 legislative action
was to limit the crime of first degree murder to a specific intent
homicide accompanied by one or more of the aggravating circum-
stances listed in Code of Criminal Procedure article 905.4." Four of
these aggravating circumstances are incorporated by Act 74 into the
first degree murder statute.
The passage of Act 74 was apparently in response to the Payton
court's interpretation of Louisiana's homicide statutes. 4 It should be
noted that the specific intent section of the second degree murder
statute"5 which had troubled the Payton court was deleted in 1978.7
Consequently, the Payton decision was rendered nugatory insofar as
it could be read to compel the 1979 legislature's action; Act 74 of
1979 attempted to correct a problem which no longer existed. Act
74, however, was enacted in an apparent effort to effectuate, in a
70. La. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 121, § 1.
71. 361 So. 2d 866 (La. 1978).
72. Id. at 870.
The court found, however, that a problem was created due to the legislature's
"clear intent" to incorporate, by reference to article 905.4, the aggravating circum-
stances under which the killing was accomplished. One of these circumstances was an
offense committed in an "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner." Evidence of
such a circumstance would be highly prejudicial and inflammatory to a jury, and there-
fore, the inclusion of this aggravating circumstance as a substantive element of the
crime would improperly impair the defendant's right to a fair determination of his
guilt or innocence. The inclusion in the Act of a severability clause, however, allowed
the court to "declare invalid only the legislative attempt to define first degree murder
as a specifically intended homicide 'committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel manner."' Id. at 872. The other aggravating circumstances under which the crime
was committed were held to be essential elements of first degree murder because of
the legislature's clear intent. Id. at 872-74.
73. 361 So. 2d at 870. See note 62, supra.
74. Pete Adams, Executive Director of the Louisiana District Attorney's Associa-
tion, in testifying before the Senate Judiciary C Committee on April 24, 1979, and
before the House Criminal Justice Committee on May 30, 1979, stated that Senate Bill
No. 110 (Act 74) was proposed to bring the first and second degree murder statutes in
compliance with the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Payton.
75. LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 121, § 1.
76. 1978 La. Acts, No. 796, amending LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1977). See note 61,
supra, and accompanying text.
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constitutionally permissible manner, the intended results of Act 121
of 1977.
The new homicide statute would seem to have several salutary
consequences, especially from the prosecution's point of view. Since
the death penalty is seldom carried out in Louisiana,7 7 there appears
to be no compelling reason to treat all specific intent murders as
capital crimes. The effective maximum penalty suffered by one con-
victed of specific intent murder is life imprisonment at hard labor
without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence;" that
same sentence can now be imposed upon the offender who is con-
victed of second degree murder. 9 Only ten of twelve jurors must
concur to convict ° and the trial court will not be required to se-
quester each juror after he is sworn.' Consequently, the return of a
guilty verdict is facilitated and the cumbersome sentencing hearing
avoided. The state is also provided the opportunity to plea bargain
whenever the charge of a specific-intent murder is made; however,
the benefit to the accused of negotiating such a plea is questionable
in light of the now increased penalty for second degree murder and
the unlikelihood of an actual execution of the death penalty. The
new scheme will also spare many of those convicted of murder from
the emotional trauma of being subjected to a possible death penalty.
In those instances where convictions are sought and returned
under the first degree murder statute, the sentencing hearing itself
will remain unchanged.82 To reach a verdict of guilty of first degree
murd4, the jury must, of necessity, have already found at least one
aggravating circumstance;" however, the remaining aggravating"
and mitigating circumstances 5 must still be considered before the
jury may recommend the death sentence.8
77. Cynthia Simpson, of the Office of the Warden, Angola State Penitentiary, told
the author on September 12, 1979: "The last execution in Louisiana took place on June
9, 1961. There are none scheduled at this time."
78. The penalty for first degree murder is death or life imprisonment at hard
labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in accordance with
the recommendation of the jury. LA. R.S. 14:30 (Supp. 1979).
79. Act 74 makes the penalty for second degree murder the same as the alternate
penalty (the only one actually carried out) for first degree murder. See notes 64 &
77, supra.
80. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 17; LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 782.
81. In a capital case, each juror is sequestered after he is sworn, while in a non-
capital case, the jury must be sequestered after the court's charge and may be se-
questered at any time upon order of the court. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 791.
82. See 361 So. 2d at 872.
83. For the substantive elements of the crime of first degree murder, see note 62,
supra.
84. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.4.
85. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.5.
86. 361 So. 2d at 868 & 872.
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One interesting outcome of Act 74 is that the two aggravating
circumstances most influential in compelling a recommendation of
the death penalty, ie., heinous murders and murders committed by
prior-convicted violent felons, are no longer sufficient, by them-
selves, to allow the imposition of the death penalty. 7 Of course, this
peculiar result is of little practical consequence since the Louisiana'
death penalty is de jure only.
While the Louisiana Supreme Court in Payton apparently sanc-
tioned in advance the homicide scheme implemented by Act 74, the
ultimate question is whether the enactment will be constitutionally
acceptable to the United States Supreme Court. The Payton court
analogized the homicide framework now enacted by Act 74 to the
capital murder provisions upheld by the Supreme Court in Jurek v.
Texas."8 This analogy suggests that the statutory scheme imple-
mented by Act 74 will indeed pass constitutional muster.89
87. The defendants in Payton attempted to argue this peculiar result to their
benefit. Id. at 873.
88. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
89. 361 So. 2d at 870-71.
A detailed comparison of Louisiana's new capital murder statutory scheme with
those of Georgia, Texas, and Florida which have been upheld is beyond the scope of
this comment. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976), Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). For a comparison of Louisiana's capital
murder system, as it existed after the 1976 legislative session, to the laws in the above
states, see Comment, First-Degree Murder Statutes and Capital Sentencing Pro-
cedures: An Analysis and Comparison of Statutory Systems for the Imposition of the
Death Penalty in Georgia, Florida, Texas, and Louisiana, 24 Loy. L. REV. 709 (1978).
That discussion is still pertinent, however, because the only major change effected by
the new legislation is the addition of four of the aggravating circumstances to the
substantive element of first degree murder-the very change in the Texas statutes
that was approved by the Supreme Court in Jurek. The sentencing hearing itself is
the same with the exception of the three additions to the list of aggravating circum-
stances. See note 65, supra.
The only other change made by Act 74 that warrants mention is the amendment to
the second degree murder statute. By allowing to the prosecution the option to charge
an accused with the non-capital offense of second degree murder, despite the fact that
the crime was committed under one of the four circumstances now listed in the first
degree homicide statute, the prosecution has been given the "standardless discretion"
to.prevent a defendant who is technically chargeable with first degree murder from
ever being subjected to the death penalty. In other words, it is within the power of the
prosecutor to choose which accused persons will be exposed to capital punishment. It
would thus seem that the legislature has provided the state with a means of circum-
venting the Roberts requirement that standards be established for consideration by
the sentencing authority in order to preclude the arbitrary and capricious imposition of
the death sentence. Since each defendant accused of having killed with specific intent
and under one of the four circumstances now listed in Revised Statutes 14:30 could
potentially suffer the death penalty, the imposition of the death sentence on any one of
those convicted is arbitrary and capricious with respect to those who were tried only
for second degree murder solely at the unbridled discretion of the district attorney.




Act 252 of 1979 amended the indecent exposure section of the
obscenity law by providing that the crime of obscenity is the inten-
tional "[e]xposure of the genitals, pubic hair, anus, vulva, or female
breast nipples in any public place or place open to the public view
with the intent of arousing sexual desire or which appeals to
prurient interest or is patently offensive."90 The legislative incentive
to change the language of this section was the interpretation given
the previous section of the statute by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in State v. Muller.' In the Muller case, the court addressed the
issue of whether the defendant, who had exposed himself in a super-
market, had violated the section of the statute defining obscenity as
the intentional
[e]xposure of the genitals, pubic hair, anus, vulva or female
breast nipples in any location or place open to the view of the
public or the people at large such as a street, highway, neutral
ground, sidewalk, park, beach, river bank or other place or loca-
tion viewable therefrom with the intent of arousing sexual
desire.92
On original hearing the court held that a supermarket was en-
compassed by the jurisprudential definition of "public place,""3 and
that since the words "such as" were traditionally construed to set
off an illustrative list, the defendant's conduct was proscribed by
the statute.9" On rehearing, however, the court found that Act 274 of
district attorney's decision removes a defendant from possible subjection to the death
penalty, while the Furman decision dealt with the issue of whether or not to impose
the death penalty on those who had been convicted of a capital offense. 428 U.S. at
199. The Court further noted that it had never held that a decision to afford an indi-
vidual defendant mercy violates the Constitution. Id.
90. 1979 La. Acts, No. 252, amending LA. R.S. 14:106(A)(1) (Supp. 1977). For the
text of this section prior to its amendment, see text at note 92, infra.
91. 365 So. 2d 464 (La. 1978). In testifying before the Senate Judiciary C Commit-
tee on June 5, 1979, Representative Rice, author of House Bill 234 (Act 252), stated
that the bill was prompted by the Muller decision.
92. LA. R.S. 14:106(A)(1) (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
93. [A] public place within the ordinance, and as applied to an enclosure, room or
building, must be considered as one wherein, by general invitation, members of
the public attend for reasons of business, entertainment, instruction or the like,
and are welcome so long as they conform to what is customarily there done ....
An eating house is a public place . . . and a restaurant is an eating house under
another name. It is within this definition that a church is a public place ... and so
a barber shop.
365 So. 2d at 465, quoting State v. Christine, 239 La. 259, 118 So. 2d 403 (1960).
Christine had relied on Nelson v. Natchez, 197 Miss. 26, 19 So. 2d 747 (1944).
94. 365 So. 2d at 465. In so interpreting the section, the court on original hearing
affirmed the trial judge's denial of the defendant's motion to quash the bill of informa-
tion.
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1974 had removed from the above section of the statute the words
"public place" and replaced them with the words "any location or
place open to the view of the public .... or other place . . . viewable
therefrom."9 The court then applied the following well-established
rules of statutory construction: "where the new statute is worded
differently from the preceeding statute, the Legislature is presumed
to have intended to change the law""'; it is the court's duty to ascer-
tain the meaning of ambiguous phrases, which duty may be dis-
charged by resort to a consideration of the words and phrases with
which they are associated. 7 Finding that those places listed in the
statute were all outdoors and in the public domain, whereas a super-
market was an enclosed space invested with some degree of ex-
clusivity, the court held that supermarkets were not places intended
to be included in the legislature's classification.99
The present Act amends this section to delete the words "such
as" and the listing following those words, returning the words
"public place" to the statute.99 This change may not, however, have
entirely clarified the issue as to what places are encompassed by
this section of the statute. In Muller the court interpreted the prior
language of the section (i.e., "any location or place open to the view
of the public or the people at large . . . or other place or location
viewable therefrom") as delimiting two classes of locations where in-
decent exposure was proscribed. The first class was held to include
"location[s] or place[s] open to the view of the public or the people at
large such as a street, highway, neutral ground, sidewalk, park,
beach, [or] river bank."'9 9 The second class was held to include
"'other place[s] or location[s] viewable therefrom,' that is, a location
or place one can see from one of the first class of locations or
places."10 1 By deleting the language "or other place or location view-
able therefrom," the second category of places would appear to be
eliminated from the scope of this section of the statute. While the
phrase "any location or 'place open to the view of the public or the
people at large" would seem broad enough to contemplate both
classes of places, such was not the construction given to these words
by the Muller court. It is admitted, however, that since the illustra-
tive listing of places which followed this phrase modified its mean-
ing somewhat, the deletion of the listing may invite a broader inter-
95. 365 So. 2d at 466 (on rehearing).
96. Id. at 467.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court then reversed the trial court's ruling, sustained the defendant's
motion to quash the bill of information, and dismissed the prosecution against the
defendant.
99. See text at note 95, supra.




pretation of the phrase so that both classes of places mentioned in
Muller might now be viewed as encompassed within its meaning.
Another potentially troublesome area is the interpretation of
the term "public place."' °2 By including this term in Act 252, the
legislature has impliedly adopted its jurisprudential definition. That
definition, however, purports to embrace only those enclosed areas
where the public may be present by "general invitation," ' 3 thereby
excluding a fortiori private gatherings from coverage. Consequently,
one might not be in violation of the statute by "streaking" across
the dais at a by-invitation-only political dinner or by "flashing" the
officers of the Women's Auxiliary at their monthly planning lun-
cheon. While the probable intent of the legislature to proscribe such
conduct should not be ignored,' neither should one disregard the
well-settled rule that criminal statutes are to "be construed strictly
in favor of the defendant and lenity."'0 °
Another change made by Act 252 is the addition of the language
"or which appeals to prurient interest or is patently offensive."'' 0
These phrases have traditionally been included in the definition of
obscene material, but were used in the conjunctive. 7 Thus, the cate-
gories of exposures prohibited are apparently expanded by the dis-
junctive inclusion of exposure. which "appeals to the prurient in-
terest" or which "is patently offensive." Such a broadened class of
proscribed conduct should be permissible since "the States have
greater power to regulate nonverbal, physical conduct than to sup-
press depictions or descriptions of the same behavior."'0 8 The terms
"patently offensive" and "prurient interest" have both been held to
be not unconstitutionally vague and to provide valid standards to be
applied by a trier of fact.'00
102. See note 93, supra.
103. See note 93, supra.
104. LA. R.S. 14:3 (1950) provides:
The articles of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes
not provided for herein; however, in order to promote justice and to effect the ob-
jects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, accord-
ing to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection
with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.
Thus, when the purpose of the statute is within its letter, it should be construed in
accordance with that purpose although the letter would admit a narrower interpreta-
tion. See State v. Butler, 331 So. 2d 425 (La. 1976).
105. State v. Muller, 365 So. 2d 464, 467 (La. 1978); State v. Young, 357 So. 2d 503
(La. 1978).
106. 1979 La. Acts, No. 252, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 14:106(A)(1) (Supp. 1977) (em-
phasis added).
107. See LA. R.S. 14:106(A)(2) to (3) (Supp. 1979); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957).
108. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 n.8 (1973).
109. State v. Burch, 365 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1978); State v. Wrestle, 360 So. 2d 831
(La. 1978).
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The addition of the "prurient interest or patently offensive"
language seems to have closed a loophole in the old statute. If a per-
son had disrobed in a commercial building as a protest against Presi-
dent Carter's order to raise thermostat settings, his conduct would
not have been proscribed by the prior statute due to an absence of
intent to arouse sexual desire. Under the new law, the intent of the
accused is irrelevant, and the effect of the exposure on his audience
assumes primary significance.
It is submitted that the changes made by Act 252 are broader
than the Muller decision necessitated. While the addition of the
"prurient interest or patently offensive" language is apparently
justified, the problem addressed in Muller could have easily been
rectified by adding to the illustrative list several enclosed locations
and places."' Like Act 274 of 1974, Act 252 of 1979 may have created
additional problems in defining and proscribing certain obscene con-
duct.
110. See text at note 94, supra.
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USUFRUCT OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
Act 678 of 1979 appears to be another manifestation of a general
and growing concern by the legislature for the financial problems
which the death of a husband or wife may cause the surviving
spouse.' The Act amends Civil Code article 916 to permit a testator
to leave his spouse a usufruct over the separate property inherited
by their children. This usufruct may be granted for life or any other
designated period, is treated in the same fashion as a legal usufruct,'
and is not to be considered an impingement on the legitime of forced
heirs.3
The surviving husband or wife was first given a legal usufruct
over the community property inherited by issue of the marriage in
1844.' This usufruct, which arises when the deceased has not made a
contrary disposition of his share of community property,5 is granted
for the life of the surviving spouse but terminates upon remarriage.'
In 1975, the legislature provided that the usufruct would not termi-
nate upon remarriage of the surviving spouse if the predeceased
spouse had "confirmed" the usufruct by testament, i.e., specifically
1. The legislature has consistently acted to place the surviving spouse in a more
advantageous position, particularly as to community property. In 1910, the surviving
spouse was allowed to inherit community property in full ownership when the de-
ceased left no descendants or ascendants, rather than restricting the survivor to a
usufruct. 1910 La. Acts, No. 57, amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 915. Only a few years
later, the legislature provided that the presence of ascendants would not exclude the
surviving spouse from taking a portion of the deceased mate's community property.
1916 La. Acts, No. 80, amending LA. Civ. CODE art. 915. Recently, the legislature has
removed parents as forced heirs as to community property, thus allowing a testator to
leave his spouse his entire community interest in the absence of legitimate descen-
dants. 1979 La. Acts, No. 778, § 1, amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 1494. As will be dis-
cussed textually at length, the extent of interests which may be left to the surviving
spouse in usufruct has also been increased.
2. A legal usufruct is one that is created by operation of law. LA. CiV. CODE art.
544. The usufruct established by Civil Code article 916 is one such example. Succession
of Waldron, 323 So. 2d 434, 436 n.4 (La. 1975).
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 916, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 678, § 1.
4. 1844 La. Acts, No. 152, § 2. This provision was incorporated into the Civil
Code of 1870 as article 916.
5. Though Civil Code article 916 by its terms applies when the deceased spouse
has not disposed of his share in the community property by testament, the jurispru-
dence has required an adverse disposition to defeat the surviving spouse's usufruct.
E.g., Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67, 96 So. 2d 44 (1957). See L. OPPENHEIM, SUCCES-
SIONS AND DONATIONS § 19, in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 63 (1973).
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 916.
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stated his wish for the usufruct to continue for the life of the sur-
vivor or some designated period.7 The legislature created a separate
legal usufruct in 1976 to cover the family home if it is community
property and even in the absence of children of the marriage.8
By keeping the community property intact, the legal usufructs
described above minimize the disruption and financial hardship ex-
perienced by the surviving spouse and family of the deceased
Because these legal usufructs attach only to community property, a
surviving spouse under a matrimonial regime of separate property
prior to Act 678 could not be similarly assisted. While a testamen-
tary usufruct could be granted over separate property, until Act 678
generally only the disposable portion of the estate could be so en-
cumbered without impinging upon the rights of forced heirs."0 These
legal usufructs are also unavailable to spouses who have judicially
separated. Since the community is dissolved by a judgment of sepa-
ration from bed and board," there is no community property there-
after to which such a usufruct could attach.2
The legislature's enactment of Act 678 has made it possible for a
spouse to grant a usufruct to his survivor over separate property as
well as community property. Thus, a greater benefit may be be-
stowed upon a larger number of spouses than ever before. However,
the usufruct over separate property must be specifically granted by
testament; it does not arise merely by operation of law. Some com-
mentators have advocated a future amendment to provide that this
usufruct over separate property should arise merely by operation of
7. 1975 La. Acts, No. 680, § 1, amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 916.
8. 1976 La. Acts, No. 227, § 1, adding LA. CIv. CODE art. 916.1. The practical
effect of article 916.1 is to prevent the decedent's parents and children by a prior mar-
riage from forcing a partition and sale of the family home. This amendment may have
been prompted in part by the court's analysis in Succession of Chauvin, 260 La. 828,
257 So. 2d 422 (1972).
9. State Dep't of Highways v. Costello, 158 So. 2d 850, 852 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963). See Note, Successions-Amendment to Article 916 Permits Confirmation of
Legal Usufruct for Life of Surviving Spouse, 50 TUL. L. REV. 973 (1976).
10. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1710; Succession of Burgess, 359 So. 2d 1006 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1978); Harang v. Harang, 317 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975); Jarreau v. Jar-
reau, 268 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972). Forced heirs in certain cases may choose
to allow a usufruct to impinge on their legitime rather than to abandon the disposable
portion in full ownership to the legatee. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 1499; Succession of
Hyde, 292 So. 2d 693 (La. 1974).
11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 155. A judgment of divorce has this same effect. Talley v.
Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
248 La. 785, 181 So. 2d 783 (1966).
12. Jarreau v. Jarreau, 268 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 263 La.
986, 270 So. 2d 122 (1972). Of course, should the spouses reconcile, the community could
be reestablished in accordance with the provisions of Civil Code article 155.
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law. 3 Certainly such an amendment would be consistent with the in-
creasingly favorable treatment the surviving spouse has enjoyed in
succession matters.' Nonetheless, the availability of this additional
usufruct offers increased flexibility in estate planning to provide
adequately for a surviving spouse. If leaving all of his property in
usufruct to the surviving spouse is the desire of the testator, then
he need not be concerned that the nature of the property will pre-
vent such a disposition.
Though this usufruct must be created by testament, it appears
that it will be treated in the same fashion as the previous legal
usufruct over community property." Thus, the surviving spouse will
be spared the necessity of furnishing security 6 and perhaps the pay-
ment of state inheritance taxes on the usufruct as well. Further, if
the usufruct has been granted for the life of the surviving spouse, it
does not terminate upon the remarriage of the survivor. Most im-
portantly, the rights of forced heirs are subject to the usufruct
which is not to be considered an impingement on their legitime.
Thus, the forced heirs are restricted to the naked ownership of the
property until the death of the survivor."
While forced heirs may argue to the contrary, Act 678 does not
appear violative of the state constitutional provision prohibiting the
passage of laws abolishing forced heirship. 9 The legislature may
"regulate or restrict" the rights of forced heirs without running
13. Professor LeVan has recommended that such a usufruct be extended auto-
matically to cover both community and separate property, regardless of whether issue
of the marriage exist. LeVan, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 29, 48
(1977).
14. See note 1, supra.
15. Act 678 provides that the usufruct over separate property "shall be treated in
the same fashion as a legal usufruct." LA. CIv. CODE art. 916, as amended by 1979 La.
Acts, No. 678, § 1.
16. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 573, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 103, § 1.
17. The state inheritance tax is not considered to be a tax on property but upon
its transmission by inheritance. Succession of Levy, 115 La. 377, 39 So. 37 (1905). It has
been held then that no inheritance taxes are owed by the legal usufructuary because
he does not acquire the usufruct by inheritance. Succession of Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So.
714 (1911); Succession of Marsal, 118 La. 212, 42 So. 778 (1907); Succession of Brown, 94
So. 2d 317 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957). See also LA. R.S. 47:2401-23 (1950). Since a
usufruct over separate property must be created by testament, it may be treated dif-
ferently. However, in Succession of Lynch, 145 So. 42 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932), a
usufruct confirmed for life in a testament was held to confer by will only the privilege
of surviving remarriage and was not subject to inheritance tax. It could be argued that
the legislature intended this new usufruct to be treated in all respects "in the same
fashion as a legal usufruct" and thus not to be subject to the state inheritance tax.
18. LA. CIv. CODE art. 478, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 180, § 1; LA. CIv.
CODE art. 535.
19. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
afoul of this prohibition." Therefore, as long as the forced heirs are
not denied the naked ownership of the property, their forced por-
tions would seemingly be satisfied.2 It should be remembered that
the usufruct only attaches to separate property inherited by issue of
the marriage; thus, property inherited by children of a prior mar-
riage or other heirs would not be so burdened.
SUCCESSION RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATES
Louisiana's succession laws require the classification of prospec-
tive heirs according to the circumstances of their birth in order to
determine their succession rights. Prior to Act 607 of 1979, children
were initially grouped into three classes - legitimate,22 illegitimate,23
and legitimated. Legitimate children were the favored class, taking
by intestacy to the exclusion of illegitimates, s with illegitimates far-
ing little better in testamentary successions." The illegitimate class
was further subdivided into three subclasses-adulterous bastards,27
incestuous bastards,2 8 and natural children,29 depending upon
whether impediments existed to the marriage of the child's
20. Succession of Earhart, 220 La. 817, 57 So. 2d 695 (1952).
21. LeVan, supra note 13, at 48.
22. LA. CiV. CODE art. 179 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 607) pro-
vided: "Legitimate children are those who are born during the marriage." See Lorio,
Succession Rights of lle gitimates in Louisiana, 24 Loy. L. REV. 1 (1978) (discussion of
the system prior to Act 607 of 1979).
23. LA. CiV. CODE art. 180 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 607) pro-
vided: "Illegitimate children are those who are born out of marriage. Illegitimate chil-
dren may be legitimated in certain cases, in the manner prescribed by law."
24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 198 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 607) pro-
vided: "Children born out of marriage, except those who are born from an incestuous
connection, are legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their father and mother,
whenever the latter have formally or informally acknowledged them for their children,
either before or after the marriage."
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 917.
26. See notes 48-49, infra, and accompanying text.
27. LA. CIv. CODE art. 182, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 4, provided:
"Adulterous bastards are those produced by an unlawful connection between two per-
sons, who, at the time when the child was conceived, were, either of them or both, con-
nected by marriage with some other person."
28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 183, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 4, provided: "In-
cestuous bastards are those who are produced by the illegal connection of two persons
who are relations within the degrees prohibited by law."
29. LA. CIV. CODE art. 202, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 4, provided:
Illegitimate children who have been acknowledged by their father, are called
natural children; those who have not been acknowledged by their father, or whose
father and mother were incapable of contracting marriage at the time of concep-




parents." Natural children were allowed to inherit from their
mother to the whole of her succession, if there were no legitimate
descendants;3 as to their father, their chances for inheritance were
less likely.2 Adulterous and incestuous bastards, however, could not
enjoy any succession rights at all, 3 being relegated to an alimony.
As a result of Act 607, children are now classified as either il-
legitimate or legitimate," legitimated children being placed within
this latter class." The subclasses of illegitimates have also been
abandoned and references in the Civil Code to natural children,
adulterous bastards, and incestuous bastards have been deleted.
The distinctions among members of the various former subclasses of
illegitimates have been reduced by the repeal of Civil Code articles
202 and 204."7 It now appears that any illegitimate child may be
acknowledged.38 The restrictions on legitimation were left basically
unchanged, however; thus, certain illegitimates still cannot be
elevated to the favored status of a legitimate child in this manner. 9
30. If the child were an incestuous bastard, the parents could never marry and
the child was thus unacknowledgeable. Article 204 by its terms prevented the
acknowledgment of even adulterous bastards unless "the parents should contract a
legal marriage with each other." An amendment to article 200, however, permitted
either parent to legitimate the child if at the time of legitimation there existed neither
a legal impediment to marriage of the parents nor legitimate descendants of the
parent desiring to legitimate the child. 1972 La. Acts, No. 391, amending LA. CIv.
CODE art. 200. Because legitimation confers greater rights to a child than does mere
acknowledgment, it is arguable that despite the language of article 204, adulterous
bastards were acknowledgeable once the requirements of article 200 had been met.
31. LA. CIv. CODE art. 918 (separate property); LA. CIv. CODE art. 915 (community
property); Brooks v. House, 168 La. 542, 122 So. 844 (1929) (community property); LA.
CIv. CODE art. 1484 (testamentary dispositions of both separate and community prop-
erty).
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 919 (illegitimate could inherit only if there were no descen-
dants, ascendants, collateral relations, nor surviving spouse); LA. Civ. CODE art. 1486
(illegitimate could receive by testament, only one-fourth of father's property, if he left
ascendants, siblings, or their descendants; one-third if he left only more remote collat-
erals).
33. LA. CIv. CODE art. 920, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 4 (intestate); LA.
CIv. CODE art. 1488, repealed by 1978 La. Acts, No. 362, § 1 (by testament).
34. LA. CIv. CODE art. 178, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 1.
35. LA. CIv. CODE art. 179, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 1.
36. 1979 La. Acts, No. 607.
37. 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 4. See note 30, supra.
38. No provisions other than articles 202 and 204, now repealed, seem to restrict a
parent's freedom to acknowledge his illegitimate child despite the existence of impedi-
ments to the marriage of the child's parents.
39. Article 200 allows legitimation by notarial act only if no impediment exists to
the marriage of the child's father and mother at the time of conception or at the time
of legitimation. See also LA. R.S. 9:391 (1950). It appears that if the parents of the
illegitimate child subsequently marry and acknowledge the child, he would then be
treated as a legitimate child. LA. CIv. CODE art. 198, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No.
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The distinctions between illegitimates and legitimates remain great,
article 206 reaffirming that illegitimate children, though duly
acknowledged, cannot claim the rights of legitimate children.
The succession rights of illegitimates have been changed in
several respects. As to community property, illegitimate children
can no longer inherit intestate from either parent." As to separate
property, the rights of the acknowledged illegitimate to inherit
intestate from either parent were left unchanged. Thus, acknowl-
edged illegitimate children of a deceased woman still inherit to the ex-
clusion of all but her legitimate descendants," and the acknowledged
illegitimate children of a deceased man inherit only to the exclusion
of the state. 2 Because all illegitimates can now be acknowledged,43
and acknowledgment remains a prerequisite to inherit intestate,"
some additional members of the class of illegitimates have been af-
forded the limited intestate rights discussed above. It appears that
the impact of Act 607 on illegitimates' intestate succession rights on
balance, however, is not favorable.
Act 607 makes several changes which allow a testator to treat
his illegitimate children more favorably. Rather than restricting il-
legitimates to mere alimony when the testator is survived by legiti-
607, § 1. However, the children formerly denominated incestuous bastards could not be
legitimated in this manner, as there always exists a legal impediment to the parents'
marriage. LA. CIv. CODE art. 95. Nonetheless, certain offspring of marriages illegally
contracted within the prohibited degree of relationship could perhaps be legitimated
according to article 198 if the legislature continues to validate periodically such
reprobated marriages, See, e.g., 1977 La. Acts, No. 365, § 1; 1974 La. Acts, No. 533, §
1; 1972 La. Acts, No. 230, § 1. Adoption is another method by which an illegitimate
child could be elevated in status. For a discussion of the changes in the adoption provi-
sions, see the section of this commentary entitled "Private Adoption.'.
40. LA. CIv. CODE art. 915, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 1. Prior to
Act 607, article 915 provided for the inheritance of the community property of a
deceased parent by the "descendants in the manner provided for by law." The
supreme court in Brooks v. House, 168 La. 542, 122 So. 844 (1929), interpreted this
phrase to mean "descendants who, under other provisions of the Code, would inherit
from the deceased, to the exclusion of the surviving spouse." Id. at 544, 122 So. at 844.
Under Civil Code article 918, acknowledged illegitimates inherited community or
separate property from their mother in the absence of legitimate descendants. Simi-
larly, under article 919, acknowledged illegitimates inherited from their father to the
exclusion of the state. The reference to the other provisions regulating the disposition
of property to descendants applies now only "in the event the deceased [leaves] legiti-
mate descendants." LA. CIv. CODE art. 915, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 1
(emphasis added).
41. LA. Civ. CODE art. 918, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 1.
42. LA. CIv. CODE art. 919, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 1.
43. See notes 30 & 37-38, supra, and accompanying text.
44. LA. CIv. CODE art. 919, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 1.
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mate descendants, as was the case previously,"5 the parent may now
donate up to the disposable portion of his estate to his illegitimate
children." When the mother leaves no legitimate descendants, or
when the father leaves neither legitimate descendants nor parents,
the whole estate may be acquired by illegitimate children.47 It also
should be noted that where no legitimate descendants survive, the
father of an illegitimate, as well as the mother, is free to dispose of
his entire interest in community property because parents are no
longer forced heirs as to community property.48 The prior, more
restrictive provisions of this section have been revised or repealed. 9
This new legislation is in part a reaction to the recent jurispru-
dential developments concerning the rights of illegitimates. 0 The
Louisiana Supreme Court in Succession of Robins51 declared that
article 1488 arbitrarily discriminated among the classes of illegiti-
mates in violation of article I, section 3 of the state constitution."
Article 1483 was likewise struck down by the court in Succession of
Thompson." The court in Thompson refuted each state interest
asserted to justify discrimination against illegitimates in their capac-
ity to receive a donation mortis causa. The strong state interest in
stability of land titles, according to the court, was in no way en-
45. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1483, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 4. See Note, All
in the Family: Equal Protection and the Illegitimate Child in Louisiana Succession
Law, 38 LA. L. REV. 189, 190 (1978).
46. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1484, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 1. Even if no
legitimate descendants survive the father of an illegitimate, that child is restricted by
article 1484 from receiving in excess of the disposable portion of the estate if a parent
of the father survives.
47. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1484, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 1.
48. 1979 La. Acts, No. 778, § 1, amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 1494. For a discussion
of this new development, see the section in this commentary entitled "Parents as
Forced Heirs."
49. Articles dealing with the testamentary disposition of property to illegitimates
repealed by Ajt 607 include article 1483 (held unconstitutional in Succession of Thomp-
son, 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979)), and articles 1486-87. Act 607 also extensively revises
articles 1484-85. Article 1488 was held unconstitutional in Succession of Robins, 349 So.
2d 276 (La. 1977), and legislatively repealed last year. 1978 La. Acts, No. 362, § 1.
Thus, this whole area has been greatly overhauled recently. For a discussion of the in-
heritance rights of illegitimates prior to Act 607, see Lorio, supra note 22.
50. Major cases by the United States Supreme Court include Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); and Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532 (1971). The Louisiana Supreme Court has also been active in this area recently.
See, e.g., Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979); Succession of Robins, 349
So. 2d 276 (La. 1977).
51. 349 So. 2d 279 (La. 1977).
52. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides: "No person shall be denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws . . . . No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discrimi-
nate against a person because of birth ....
53. 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979).
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dangered by allowing the illegitimate to receive this donation."
Even in an intestate succession where stability of land titles is a
valid concern, equality between legitimate and illegitimate children
may be constitutionally compelled, subject to the state's freedom to
provide a reasonable manner in which parentage must be proven."
While the level of required proof of paternity may be quite high, 6 it
appears that Louisiana can no longer simply exclude illegitimates
from most of the succession rights enjoyed by legitimate children.
Act 607 represents only an initial legislative step toward equality
for illegitimates which may well leave Louisiana's treatment of
illegitimates' succession rights yet unable to pass constitutional
muster. 7
ALIMONY BETWEEN ASCENDANTS AND DESCENDANTS
Civil Code article 229, prior to its 1979 amendment, provided a
reciprocal obligation of support between needy direct ascendants
and descendants. 8 Act 249 of 1979 amends article 229 by limiting
this obligation "to life's basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter,
and health care."59 Additionally, the Act requires proof of the inabil-
ity of the direct ascendant or descendant seeking alimony to obtain
these necessities by other means in order for the obligation to
arise."0
The Act's limitation on the types of things that can be con-
sidered "basic necessities" does not appear to change the law.
54. Id. at 798.
55. Comment, Can Louisiana's Succession Laws Survive in Light of the Supreme
Court's Recent Recognition of Illegitimates' Rights?, 39 LA. L. REV. 1132, 1141 (1979).
This article would be helpful to the reader in his analysis of the constitutional prob-
lems which remain after Act 607.
56. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). The New York statute at issue in Lalli
required a court order of filiation made prior to death of the father. The Court held
that the statute did not unconstitutionally discriminate against the illegitimate plaintiff
even though the deceased father had formally acknowledged the child prior to the
father's death.
57. See Comment, supra note 55. See also Work of the Appellate Courts-1976-
1977-Successions and Donations, 38 LA. L. REV. 395 (1978).
58. LA. CIV. CODE art. 229 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 249) pro-
vided: "Children are bound to maintain their father and mother and other ascendants,
who are in need; and the relatives in the direct ascending line are likewise bound to
maintain their needy descendants, this obligation being reciprocal." This sentence is
retained by Act 249.
59. Thus, the Act in effect defines the phrase "in need" found in article 229's first
sentence. See note 58, supra. For the text of the amendment, see note 60, infra.
60. Act 249 added the following sentence to article 229: "This reciprocal obligation
is limited to life's basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter, and health care, and arises




Courts faced with the problem of interpreting "need" under article
229 have decided that it encompasses food, clothing, shelter,61 and
health care.2 Further, article 230 generally defines alimony"a as
"what is necessary for the nourishment, lodging, and support of the
person who claims it."64 Thus, the Act's "limitation" of the obligation
to food, clothing, shelter, and health care is virtually no limitation at
all. Under article 230's definition of alimony, only if "support" is
viewed as encompassing more than food, clothing, shelter, and
health care could it be argued that the Act "limits" the obligation. 5
Additionally, the evidentiary requirement that the person claim-
ing alimony must prove his need does not appear to represent a
change in the law. The courts have consistently required proof of
need, prior to this amendment. Even prior to Act 249, to have been
considered "in need," one would have had to allege and prove a
physical or mental impairment preventing his acquisition of gainful
employment.6
However, by virtue of Act 249, the amount of need which a
plaintiff must show has been increased. The specific amount of proof
now demanded by article 229 as amended is very similar to that im-
posed upon illegitimates claiming alimony from their parents or
their parents' heirs.67 Article 242 requires that illegitimates "prove
in a satisfactory manner that they stand absolutely in need of such
alimony for support."6 Since the person claiming alimony under arti-
61. See Tobin v. Tobin, 323 So. 2d 896, 899 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
325 So. 2d 613 (La. 1976); Johnson v. Johnson, 128 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
62. See Sutton v. Rogers, 222 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 2d Cir, 1969); Elchinger v.
Elchinger, 135 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
63. The phrase "to maintain" in article 229 is a mistranslation of the French ver-
sion. It should have been translated as "to give alimony to." See 1972 COMPILED EDI-
TION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 229 (J. Dainow ed.).
64. LA. CiV. CODE art. 230 provides: "By alimony we understand what is neces-
sary for the nourishment, lodging and support of the person who claims it. It includes
the education, when the person to whom the alimony is due is a minor."
65. Article 230, however, includes education within the definition of alimony, so
long as the person claiming the alimony is a minor. See note 64, supra. Thus, an argu-
ment might be made that the Act does in fact "limit" the obligation since education is
not a basic necessity within the terms of the Act. See note 60, supra. However, the
obligation imposed upon parents by article 227 to educate their children has been left
intact. Thus, the failure to include education in the article 229 alimony obligation is of
little practical significance.
66. See Demarie v. Demarie, 295 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974) (lack of high
school diploma held not sufficient to establish proof of need); Dubroc v. Dubroc, 284 So.
2d 869 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973) (merely not working held not sufficient to establish
proof of need).
67. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 239-43.
68. (Emphasis added.) As a consequence of this requirement, an illegitimate's
receipt of as little as $100 a month in social security and Veteran's Administration
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cle 229 must prove that he could not obtain these necessities from
other sources, he is probably required to avail himself, if eligible, of
governmental programs that provide these necessities. This seems a
strange requirement indeed, since one of the justifications for ali-
mony is to prevent the needy person from becoming a ward of the
state.69 Article 229 as amended would appear to require a person to
become a ward of the state in order to qualify for alimony. However,
in becoming a ward of the state, the potential recipient apparently
no longer qualifies for alimony. If the basic necessities of life are
provided by the state in the form of welfare payments, medical care,
food stamps, and the like, then the claimant is no longer "in need."7
Arguably, then, the right to alimony is an illusory one, with the real
obligation of support being shifted to the state.
PRIVATE ADOPTION
By Act 686 of 1979, the legislature has provided an additional
procedure for private" adoption of minors in Louisiana. The Act ap-
parently reflects a general movement to encourage adoption and dis-
courage abortion" in that it attempts to offer a more attractive
alternative to abortion than does the older system of private adop-
tion. 3 The new procedure is designed to be quick, possibly anony-
mous, and reliable. If the Act achieves its aims, it may further pre-
vent extortion of adoptive parents by natural parents, and frequent
changes of child custody.74
benefits was held to bar her from receiving alimony. Succession of Vincent, 229 So. 2d
449 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), aff'd on other grounds sub. nom., Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532 (1971).
69. See Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304, 308-09 (La. 1978) (on original hear-
ing), vacated on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1488 (1979).
70. See note 68, supra. Apparently, only if the courts are willing to find that the
governmental aid does not provide "life's basic necessities" will a claimant be success-
ful.
71. Private adoption, as discussed in this commentary, does not encompass either
adoption by agency placement, LA. R.S. 9:434(1) (1950), or adoption by blood relatives,
LA. R.S. 9:422.1 (Supp. 1958); LA. R.S. 9:434(2-5) (1950 & Supp. 1978).
72. See generally Kirsch v. Parker, 375 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
The amendment [to Revised Statutes 40:81 to require the sealing of adoption
records to insure anonymity of natural parents surrendering children for adop-
tion] was the product of pro-adoption and anti-abortion forces .... [T]he amend-
ment has the purpose of persuading pregnant women to elect adoption over abor-
tion by promising undiscoverability not previously available ....
Id. at 696.
73. Act 686 did not repeal older private adoption provisions contained in Revised
Statutes 9:421-34.
74. These problems occur when the adoption process is lengthy, and natural
parents retain the right to bar the adoption until that process is completed. Wadling-




The present agency placement procedure has been the easiest
method of adoption in Louisiana. Under this system, natural parents
irrevocably consent to adoption at the time they surrender the
child,"5 and such adoptions can be concluded in less than one year. 6
Moreover, adoption agencies can assure the parties of anonymity by
acting as intermediaries between the surrendering parents and the
adopting parents." By contrast, prior to Act 686, natural parents
could revoke consent to private adoption at any time up until the
granting of the interlocutory decree, and such revocation would ab-
solutely nullify the adoption and require the return of the child to
the natural parents. 8 The procedure for private adoption could take
up to two years" and essentially required contact between the sur-
rendering and adopting parents, preventing an anonymous adop-
tion .o
The Act may be seen as an attempt to provide a procedure of
private adoption with the benefits of agency adoption. For example,
it shortens the process by allowing a petition for final decree of
75. LA. R.S. 9:402 (1950).
76. Revised Statutes 9:434(1) allows adoptive parents to petition for final adoption
after the child, placed with them by an adoption agency, has lived with them for six
months. See also Wadlington, supra note 74, at 214-15.
77. Wadlington, supra note 74, at 213-14.
78. Id. at 217. See also Moreland v. Craft, 244 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971)
(application of the continuing consent requirement). Act 686 amends Revised Statutes
9:429 to remove this continuing consent requirement.
79. The older system (apparently still in force after Act 686) allows private adop-
tion in the following steps:
1. Petition for adoption by the adopting parent(s). LA. R.S. 9:422 (Supp. 1975 &
1978).
2. Service of the petition on the Department of Health and Human Resources, and
on the natural parent(s). LA. R.S. 9:425 (1950 & Supp. 1976).
3. Investigation by the Department. LA. R.S. 9:427 (1950 & Supp. 1977).
4. A judicial hearing between thirty and sixty days after completion of service.
LA. R.S. 9:428 (1950). At this time or later, the court may grant an interlocu-
tory decree of adoption. LA. R.S. 9:429 (1950 & Supp. 1960).
5. Between six months and two years after granting of the interlocutory decree
(so long as the child has lived with the adopting parents for one year), a peti-
tion for a final decree of adoption. LA. R.S. 9:431 (1950 & Supp. 1960); LA. R.S.
9:432 (1950 & Supp. 1977).
6. Further investigation by the Department. LA. R.S. 9:432 (Supp. 1960 & 1977).
Between the granting of the interlocutory decree and the granting of the final
decree, the Department must maintain contact with the adoptive home. LA.
R.S. 9:430 (1950).
7. A judicial hearing, and granting of the final decree of adoption. Again, the
hearing must be held between thirty and sixty days after service of the peti-
tion. LA. R.S. 9:432 (1950 & Supp. 1977).
80. Revised Statutes 9:425 requires that the petition for interlocutory decree of
adoption be served upon the natural parent(s). See also Wadlington, supra note 74, at
221.
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adoption to be filed six months after the granting of the interlocu-
tory decree, removing the additional requirement that a child live
with his adoptive parents for one year before filing of the petition
for final decree.8" The Act further significantly limits the "continu-
ing consent" requirement82 by limiting the time in which surrender-
ing parents may revoke their consent 3 and by allowing courts to
grant adoption decrees despite such parental revocation. 4 Finally,
the Act allows attorneys to act as intermediaries between the sur-
rendering and adopting parents so as to safeguard the identities of
these parties.85
Unlike agency adoptions, Act 686 permits natural parents to
revoke their consent to adoption. Any parent listed on the birth cer-
tificate and signing the original act of surrender 8 may revoke the
consent indicated in the act of surrender within thirty days of the
act. 7 However, this revocation does not absolutely prevent final
adoption, as a court may still render an interlocutory or final decree
of adoption if it finds adoption to be in the best interests of the
child.88 A natural parent not listed on the birth certificate and who
has not signed the act of surrender may also oppose the adoption at
any time before the rendering of the interlocutory decree,88 so long
81. LA. R.S. 9:432(C), added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 686.
82. As to adoptions under the older procedure, see note 79 supra.
83. LA. R.S. 9:422.10, added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 686. This revocation must be by
"clear, written declaration" and must be sent by registered mail to those to whom cus-
tody was granted.
84. LA. R.S. 9:422.11, added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 686.
85. LA. R.S. 9:422.9, added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 686.
86. The act of surrender must be executed by parents listed on the child's birth
certificate. LA. R.S. 9:422.4, added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 686. If only the mother is
listed, she may sign alone. Should any parent be a minor, the minor's parent, custodial
parent, or guardian must co-sign the act.
87. LA. R.S. 9:422.10, added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 686.
88. LA. R.S. 9:422.11, added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 686.
89. LA. R.S. 9:422.11, added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 686, provides in pertinent part:
"Should an interlocutory decree have been entered without opposition, the child shall
not be removed from the custody of the prospective adoptive parents nor the final
decree of adoption denied unless there is an unfavorable recommendation by the
department or the prospective adoptive parents are found to be unfit." This appar-
ently indicates that all opposition, even that by a father not indicated on the birth cer-
tificate and not executing the act of surrender, after the granting of the interlocutory
decree, is to have no effect. Evidently the legislature intended to limit the non-indi-
cated parent's period of opposition to the thirty days which must pass before granting
of the interlocutory decree. However, because this parent's consent to surrender is not
required, and because he may not be notified of adoption proceedings, a court may find
that section 422.11 does not control the non-indicated parent's right to oppose the
adoption. Instead, it may apply section 422.10 which states that "[t]he nonindicated
parent may oppose the adoption only by proof of the legal and formal acknowledge-
ment or legitimation of the child by that parent prior to the entering of a decree of
adoption." (Emphasis added.) "A decree" may be taken to mean the final decree.
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as he shows he has legitimated or formally acknowledged the child."
Again, such opposition does not bar a final or interlocutory decree if
a court finds that adoption serves the best interests of the child."
The legislature has attempted to reconcile the interests of
natural parents with the interest in providing a quick and reliable
procedure for private adoption. When those interests conflict, as
when natural parents later oppose the adoption, the legislature has
called upon the courts to resolve the conflict in light of the child's
best interests. In Wood v. Beard," the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated:
The best interest of the minor is not served by denying parental
custody after deciding which of two qualified, competing family
groups can deliver a quality of child custody more pleasing to
the court. A judicial comparison of the qualified competitors for
custody does violence to the rule of "parental right."
When the parent competes with non-parents of the child, the
parent's right to custody is superior, unless the parent is unable
or unfit, having forfeited parental rights.
If courts now apply such a test, they will protect the "parental
right," but will violate the purpose of Act 686, to allow adoptive
parents to rely as much as possible upon the initial surrender.
The court in Wood created an exception to its rule in the case of
parents who have forfeited their parental rights. 4 The act of sur-
render executed by parents listed on the birth certificates may evi-
dence such a forfeiture. Natural fathers not listed and not executing
the act, who only acknowledge the child, may not have parental
rights to forfeit. However, the Civil Code gives those presumed to
be fathers (whether or not listed on the child's birth certificate),9
and those who have legitimated their children, 0 full "parental
rights."97 To allow the divestiture of these rights with less than a
90. LA. R.S. 9:422.10, added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 686.
91. LA. R.S. 9:422.11, added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 686. Revised Statutes 9:404
absolutely bars surrender by the mother of a child for agency adoption if the natural
father has formally acknowledged or legitimated the child.
92. 290 So. 2d 675 (La. 1974) (a habeas corpus action brought by a mother against
her parents with whom she had left her child, and who now refused to return the
child).
93. Id. at 677.
94. Id.
95. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 184-90.
96. LA. CIv. CODE art. 179, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, provides:
"Legitimate children are those who are either born or conceived during marriage or
who have been legitimated as provided hereafter."
97. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 215-38.
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forfeiture or abandonment 8 may do violence to our notion of the
rights of parenthood.
The Act may also run counter to the equal protection clause of
the Constitution as recently interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court in Caban v. Mohammed.9 That case invalidated a
New York statute which required that a mother of an illegitimate
child consent to the child's adoption, but which permitted the child's
father only to "oppose" the adoption."' The natural parents, though
never married, had lived with their children as a "natural family"
for several years. The appellant father had been listed on the chil-
dren's birth certificates. After the parents separated, the mother
married, and a state court allowed her and her new husband to
adopt the children, over the natural father's objection. The court
found the statute in question permitted unequal treatment according
to sex.1"' Perhaps the new Louisiana private adoption procedure will
pass the constitutional test of Caban because under it, neither
natural parent can absolutely prevent an adoption after the initial
surrender. However, where the birth certificate lists only the
natural mother as a parent, the procedure gives her sole discretion
to initiate the process.0 2
Caban recognized that states have an important interest in pro-
viding a reliable adoption procedure.' °3 However, it found that this
interest did not justify divesting a natural father of "a relationship
with his children fully comparable to that of the mother." ' Lan-
guage in the opinion indicates that states may be permitted to pre-
98. Wood v. Beard, 290 So. 2d at 677.
99. 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
100. "[A]n unwed mother has the authority under New York law to block the adop-
tion of her child simply by withholding consent. The unwed father has no similar con-
trol over the fate of his child, even when his parental relationship is substantial-as in
this case." Id. at 1765.
101. Id. at 1766.
102. Many hospitals permit mothers alone to fill out birth certificate forms. This
procedure prevents one presumed to be the father from appearing as the father on the
birth certificate.
103.
The State's interest in providing for the well-being of illegitimate children is
an important one. We do not question that the best interests of such children
often may require their adoption into new families who will give them the stabil-
ity of a normal, two-parent home. Moreover, adoption will remove the stigma
under which illegitimate children suffer. But the unquestioned right of the State
to further these desirable ends by legislation is not in itself sufficient to justify
the gender-based distinction of § 111.
99 S. Ct. at 1767-68. Accord, Collins v. Division of Foster Care, No. 10,065 (La. App.
4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1979).
104. 99 S. Ct. at 1766 & 1768. The Court found no reason to believe that unwed




sume the absence of such a relationship in the period immediately
following birth."'5 If so, Louisiana may constitutionally require
fathers to legitimate or formally acknowledge the child during this
period before being allowed the right to oppose an adoption. But
Caban's primary question concerns the extent of that right of op-
position, for the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statutory
scheme which allowed the father merely the right to oppose the
adoption. If Act 686 permits a mother to surrender her child for
adoption and allows the child's natural or presumed father, who has
established a paternal relationship with the child by whatever
method, merely to oppose the adoption, it conflicts with Caban and
should be reconsidered in that light.
PARENTS AS FORCED HEIRS
Louisiana's succession laws reserve a portion of the estate of a
decedent in favor of surviving members of certain classes of individ-
uals regardless, of the intentions of the testator."' These "forced
heirs" 7 are the decedent's legitimate descendants 8 or, in their
absence, his parents."9 That strong societal values underlie the insti-
105.
Because the question is not before us, we express no view as to whether such
difficulties [such as location of the father] would justify a statute addressed par-
ticularly to newborn adoptions, setting forth more stringent requirements con-
cerning the acknowledgment of paternity or a stricter definition of abandonment.
Id. at 1768 n.11. The Court also stated: "In Quilloin v. Walcott, [434 U.S. 246 (1978)],
we noted the importance in cases of this kind of the relationship that in fact exists be-
tween the parent and child." Id at 1769 n.14 (emphasis added).
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal recently upheld the constitutionality
of Revised Statutes 9:404 which permits the mother of an illegitimate child to sur-
render that child for agency adoption on her own if the child has not been formally
acknowledged or legitimated by the natural father. The natural father challenged such
a surrender of a three-month old child though the father did not formally acknowledge
the child until nine months after the surrender. The court ruled that the state's inter-
est in proper identification of the natural father justified the requirement that the
father formally acknowledge or legitimate the child before having rights to participate
in the surrender or oppose it. Collins v. Division of Foster Care, No. 10,065 (La. App.
4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1979).
106. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1493 provides in pertinent part: "Donations inter vivos or
mortis causa can not exceed two-thirds of the property of the disposer, if he leaves, at
his decease, a legitimate child; one-half, if he leaves two children; and one-third, if he
leaves three or a greater number .. "
LA. CIv. CODE'art. 1494 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 778) provided in
pertinent part: "Donations inter vivos or mortis causa can not exceed two-thirds of the
property, if the disposer, having no children, leaves a father, mother, or both ...."
107. For a good discussion of the history and general considerations of forced heir-
ship, see LeVan, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L. REV. 29 (1977).
108. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1493.
109. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1494.
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tution of forced heirship in Louisiana is evidenced by the consider-
able protection afforded the rights of forced heirs in both the con-
stitution11 ° and Civil Code."' However, the strength of adherence to
the values supporting forced heirship may be weakening."2
Act 778 of 1979 makes parents forced heirs only as to the sepa-
rate property of their children who predecease them without legiti-
mate descendants."' Thus, a testator may donate his interest in com-
munity property free of any legal complaint by the parents. Article
1494 is left otherwise unchanged by the Act.
One effect of Act 778 is to give an individual more freedom to
dispose of his property as he sees fit. Increased flexibility in estate
planning allows the testator to provide more adequately for family
members in greatest need, particularly the surviving spouse.1 14 It
may be surmised that the legislature in enacting Act 778 was moti-
vated in part by a desire to strengthen the position of the surviving
spouse. This would be consistent with other recent changes favoring
the surviving spouse."' However, it must be remembered that the
surviving spouse is not a forced heir and need not be left anything
in addition to the one-half interest in the community property which
the survivor independently owns. The surviving spouse benefits
from this increased freedom to donate which Act 778 affords, only to
the extent the predeceased spouse chooses to bequeath to thesur-
vivor this portion earlier reserved for the parents; the testator may
choose instead to leave this community property to "strangers."
Removing parents as forced heirs as to community property
raises potential constitutional problems. The Louisiana Constitution
of 1921 explicitly stated that no law shall be passed abolishing forc-
110. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
111. For example, the potent remedies of reduction, LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1502-18,
and to descendant forced heirs, collation, LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1227-88, are available.
See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 2239.
112. For instance, the forced portion may now be placed in trust. LA. CONST. art.
XII, § 5; LA. R.S. 9:1841-47 (Supp. 1964). Also, the legal usufruct of the surviving
spouse has been extended in recent years at the expense of forced heirs. E.g., LA. CIv.
CODE arts. 916-16.1. See the discussion of the legal usufruct in the section of this com-
mentary entitled "Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse." See also LeVan, supra note 107.
113. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1494, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 778, § 1, provides
in pertinent part: "With respect to separate property, donations inter vivos or mortis
causa can not exceed two-thirds of the property, if the disposer, having no children,
leaves a father, mother, or both .... " (Emphasis added.)
114. Because the majority of successions are relatively small, efficient allocation of
assets of the estate is very important. See LeVan, supra note 107, at 42.
115. See particularly the 1979 amendments to Civil Code article 915, 1979 La. Acts,
No. 607, § 1; and to article 916, 1979 La. Acts, No. 678, § 1; and the section in this com-
mentary entitled "Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse."
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ed heirship."' In light of this constitutional protection, when a bill
similar to Act 778 was introduced in 1962,"7 a joint resolution was
also introduced that would have amended the constitution."' The
present constitution repeats the prohibition against the abolition of
forced heirs, but states further that the determination of those heirs
and the amount of the forced portion shall be provided by law."9 It
can be argued that Act 778 does not abolish forced heirship, but
merely restricts or modifies the rights of one class of forced heirs as
to one type of property.2 ' The constitutional doubts will linger,
however, until resolved by the courts.
CHILD CUSTODY
By Act 718 of 1979, the legislature amended Louisiana Civil
Code articles 146 and 157 to require courts, in separation, divorce,
or post-divorce proceedings, to award custody of children of the mar-
riage "in accordance with the best interest of the child or chil-
dren"'' rather than on the basis of codal or jurisprudential presump-
tions favoring the mother. Prior to 1979, article 146 provided that
the mother should be granted custody pendente lite in the absence
116. LA. CONST. OF 1921, art. IV, § 16.
117. La. H.B. No. 310, 25th Reg. Sess. (1962). For a discussion of this bill, see Com-
ment, Forced Heirs, The Legitime and Loss of the Legitime in Louisiana, 37 TUL. L.
REv. 710, 733 (1963); Note, Successions-Proposed Louisiana Civil Code Amendments
to Favor the Surviving Spouse of a Childless Marriage When a Parent of the De-
ceased Also Survives, 37 TUL. L. REv. 322, 323 (1963).
118. La. H.B. No. 1247, 25th Reg. Sess. (1962).
119. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
120. Even under the 1921 constitution, the legislature was said to be able to regu-
late and restrict the rights of forced heirs as long as forced heirship was not wiped out
or destroyed. Succession of Earhart, 220 La. 817, 824-25, 57 So. 2d 695, 697 (1952). See
Le Van, supra note 107, at 48 n.82.
121. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 718, provides:
If there are children of the marriage, whose provisional keeping is claimed by
both husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, it shall be
granted to the husband or the wife, in accordance with the best interest of the
children. In all cases, the court shall inquire into the fitness of both the mother
and the father and shall award custody to the parent the court finds will in all
respects be in accordance with the best interest of the child or children. Such cus-
tody hearing may be held in private chambers of the judge.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 157(A), as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 718, provides:
In all cases of separation and divorce, and changes of custody after an original
award, permanent custody of the child or children shall be granted to the husband
or the wife, in accordance with the best interest of the child or children, without
any preference being given on the-basis of sex of the parent. Such custody hear-
ing may be held in the private chambers of the judge. The party under whose
care the child or children is placed, or to whose care the child or children has
been entrusted, shall of right become natural tutor or tutrix of said child or chil-
dren to the same extent and with the same effect as if the other party had died.
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of "strong reasons to deprive her of it." Act 718 removed this mater-
nal preference. Article 157 included, prior to Act 718, a requirement
that permanent custody be awarded according to the children's best
interest, and Act 718 added to this article a clause stating that
courts awarding custody should not prefer one parent over another
because of the parent's sex.
Article 157, prior to amendment in 1977, provided that the
parent obtaining the separation or divorce should receive permanent
custody of children of the marriage. Courts could award permanent
custody to the other parent "for the greater advantage of the chil-
dren." 2 However, in practice courts virtually ignored the first part
of this provision and instead used the maternal preference rule to
decide which parent received permanent child custody.123 Finding
the best interest of the children always served by an award of
custody to their mother,'24 courts denied custody to mothers only in
exceptional circumstances. 22 The double burden rule applied by the
courts presented a considerable obstacle to parents seeking recon-
sideration of an earlier permanent custody decree. 2 ' A parent seek-
ing a change of custody had the double burden of proving (1) that
the children's present living environment was detrimental to their
interests, and (2) that he or she could provide a better living en-
vironment for the children. 7 The rule, designed to promote stability
of custody decrees and discourage custody litigation, 8 assured per-
petuation of the article 157 maternal preference in post-divorce pro-
ceedings.
In 1977, the legislature amended article 157 to state that perma-
nent custody "shall be granted to the husband or wife, in accordance
with the best interest of the child or children."'" With this amend-
122. LA. CIv. CODE art. 157 (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, No. 448).
123. Note, Child Custody: Preference to the Mother, 34 LA. L. REV. 881 (1974).
124. See text at note 132, infra.
125. [C]ustody should not be denied the mother unless she is morally unfit or other-
wise unstable, and then only when the immorality or instability is such that these
characteristics and her conduct adversely affect the child. It is only in exceptional
cases that the child's best interest is served by changing custody from the mother
to the father.
Nethkin v. Nethkin, 307 So. 2d 563, 567 (La. 1975), quoting Abreo v. Abreo, 281 So. 2d
695, 697 (La. 1973).
126. A "considered decree" of child custody is reached when evidence is taken in a
judicial proceeding "in regard to the defendant's fitness to have care, custody, and con-
trol of the children." Stevens v. Stevens, 340 So. 2d 584, 587 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976). A
default judgment may be a considered decree if evidence is taken at a hearing prior to
the judgment. Id. See also Note, Maternal Preference and the Double Burden: Best
Interest of Whom?, 38 LA. L. REv. 1096, 1104-05 (1978).
127. Note, supra note 126, at 1102.
128. Id.
129. 1977 La. Acts, No. 448, amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 157.
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ment, the legislature may have intended to prevent application of
the maternal preference rule in determinations of permanent cus-
tody. It included the words "to the husband or wife" which perhaps
required spouses to be treated equally in these determinations.13
However, the language of the amendment tracked the language
which courts had used in explaining the maternal preference rule. In
Fulco v. Fulco,31 the supreme court stated: "The general rule is that
it is in the best interest of the children of the marriage to grant
custody to the mother . 32 The legislature may have viewed the
amendment as a codification of the maternal preference rule. The
fact that the legislature did not enact a corresponding "best inter-
est" amendment to article 146 perhaps confirms this interpretation.
Arguably, removal of the maternal preference rule for permanent
custody determinations but retention of it for pendente lite custody
determinations would have been inconsistent, especially in light of
the double burden rule designed to promote stability of environment
by discouraging frequent custody changes.133
Appellate court decisions immediately revealed uncertainty as
to the intent of this amendment to article 157. Courts, even of the
same circuits,- reached inconsistent results. Panels of the second and
fourth circuits held that the 1977 amendment abrogated the mater-
nal preference rule.134 Other panels of the same circuits held that the
amendment codified the maternal preference rule, basing these deci-
sions on the view that the maternal preference rule serves the chil-
dren's best interest.
15
Some appellate courts avoided this uncertainty by basing
awards of permanent custody on the double burden rule.13 These
130. See The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1977 Regular Session-
Child Custody, 38 LA. L. REV. 51, 58-59 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Child Custody].
131. 259 La. 1122, 254 So. 2d 603 (1971).
132. Id. at 1127, 254 So. 2d at 605 (emphasis added).
133. Child Custody, supra note 130, at 58-59.
134. Spencer v. Talabock, 370 So. 2d 684 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Hegan v. Hegan,
367 So. 2d 147 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
135. Doyle v. Doyle, 371 So. 2d 344 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Coltharp v. Coltharp,
368 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 578 (La. 1979).
Courts may apply this argument even to article 157 as amended in 1979. In the re-
cent case of Arnold v. Arnold, No. 7,103 (La. App. 3d Cir. Oct. 10, 1979), Judge Guidry,
in a concurring opinion joined by another member of a three-judge panel of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal, argued that the article as amended does not overrule or
supersede Fulco. He stated: "The guidelines set forth in Fulco are based upon sound
sociological principles, the application of whiich insures, in my judgment, the desired
result in all custody matters, ie., a custody disposition which will be in the best inter-
est of the children." Id.
136. E.g., Coltharp v. Coltharp, 368 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d
578 (La. 1979).
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courts held pendente lite awards controlled permanent awards
unless the non-custodial spouse could meet the double burden. Pre-
viously, neither de facto custody nor awards of custody pendente
lite qualified as "considered decrees" required for application of the
double burden rule.'37 These rulings effectively retained the mater-
nal preference rule as they perpetuated decrees made under the ex-
plicit article 146 maternal preference.13
The legislature apparently intended to eliminate the use of the
maternal preference rule in child custody determinations by enact-
ing Act 718. The Act removed the explicit maternal preference in
article 146 and substituted a "best interest" test. It retained the
article 157 "best interest" test but added language indicating that
this test should be applied without consideration of maternity or
paternity. Finally, it included post-divorce custody determinations
within article 157, indicating that the best interest test, rather than
the double burden rule, should govern in these determinations.
GENDER-NEUTRAL ALIMONY
In the recent case of Orr v. Orr,"9 the United States Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional an Alabama statute which restricted
the award of alimony to women only;"' this result effectively im-
paired Louisiana's alimony laws which, as written,"' had provided
137. Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 254 So. 2d 603 (1971); Decker v. Landry, 227 La.
603, 80 So. 2d 91 (1955).
138. E.g., Coltharp v. Coltharp, 368 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d
578 (La. 1979).
139. 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
140. The Court found that the statute in question violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court
stated:
Where ... the State's compensatory and ameliorative purposes are as well served
by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender-classifies and therefore car-
ries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to
classify on the basis of sex. And this is doubly so where the choice made by the
State appears to redound-if only indirectly-to the benefit of those without need
for special solicitude.
Id. at 1113 (citations omitted).
141. LA. CIV. CODE art. 148 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 72) provided:
If the wife has not a sufficient income for her maintenance pending the suit for
separation from bed and board or for divorce, the judge shall allow her, whether
she appears as plaintiff or defendant, a sum for her support, proportioned to her
needs and to the means of her husband.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 160 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 72) provided:
When the wife has not been at fault, and she has not sufficient means for her
support, the court may allow her, out of the property and earnings of the hus-
band, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his income when:
1. The wife obtains the divorce;
2. The husband obtains a divorce on the ground that he and his wife have been
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that only a woman could receive alimony. In response, the legisla-
ture passed Act 72 of 1979 which amends Louisiana Civil Code arti-
cle 148, dealing with alimony pendente lite,"' and article 160,4
governing permanent alimony, to reflect the "gender-neutral" treat-
ment required by the United States Supreme Court.
A reading of article 148 as amended reveals few textual
living separate and apart, or on the ground that there has been no reconciliation
between the spouses after a judgment of separation from bed and board, for a
specified period of time; or
3. The husband obtained a valid divorce from his wife in a court of another state
or country which had no jurisdiction over her person.
This alimony shall be revoked if it becomes unnecessary, and terminates if the
wife remarries.
The constitutionality of article 148, governing alimony pendente lite, had been
upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Williams v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 438 (1976).
The court found no violation of either the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment or of the Louisiana constitution. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides in perti-
nent part: "No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against
a person because of . . . sex .... " Prior to Orr, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358-So. 2d 304, 314 (1978) (on rehearing), had upheld the con-
stitutionality of article 160, which governs permanent alimony. The decision was subse-
quently vacated by the United States Supreme Court because of possible conflict with
Orr. Loyacano v. LeBlanc, 99 S. Ct. 1488 (1979). Because the husband in Loyacano ac-
quiesced in the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court rendered on rehearing, the
court felt there was no longer any controversy before it. Thus, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reinstated its opinion on remand. No. 59,688, slip op. at 3 (La. Oct. 8, 1979).
142. LA. CIv. CODE art. 148, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 72, provides:
If the spouse has not sufficient income for maintenance pending suit for separa-
tion from bed and board or for divorce, the judge may allow the claimant spouse,
whether plaintiff or defendant, a sum for that spouse's support, proportioned to
the needs of the claimant spouse and the means of the other spouse.
For the text of article 148 prior to amendment, see note 141, supra.
143. LA. CiV. CODE art. 160, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 72, provides:
When a spouse has not been at fault and has not sufficient means for support,
the court may allow that spouse, out of the property and earnings of the other
spouse, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his or her income. Alimony
shall not be denied on the ground that one spouse obtained a valid divorce from
the other spouse in a court of another state or country which had no jurisdiction
over the person of the claimant spouse. In determining the entitlement and
amount of alimony after divorce, the court shall consider the income, means, and
assets of the spouses; the liquidity of such assets; the financial obligations of the
spouses, including their earning capacity; the effect of custody of children of the
marriage upon the spouse's earning capacity; the time necessary for the recipient
to acquire appropriate education, training, or employment; the health and age of
the parties and their obligations to support or care for dependent children; any
other circumstances that the court deems relevant.
In determining whether the claimant spouse is entitled to alimony, the court
shall consider his or her earning capability, in light of all other circumstances.
This alimony shall be revoked if it becomes unnecessary and terminates if the
spouse to whom it has been awarded remarries.
For the text of article 160 prior to amendment, see note 141, supra.
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changes: the word "spouse" or the phrase "claimant spouse" has
been substituted for the words "husband" or "wife"; the word
"may" has replaced the word "shall" in regard to the judge's award-
ing of alimony . 44 In contrast, article 160 has undergone more signifi-
cant textual alterations. In addition to the "spouse"/"claimant
spouse" substitutions, the legislature has added specific criteria to
assist the trial judge in determining whether a spouse is entitled to
alimony and, if so, the amount of such alimony.'45 These factors,
which are largely codifications of prior jurisprudence interpreting
the article, include:4. the liquidity of the spouses' assets;47 the effect
of custody of children of the marriage upon the claimant spouse's
earning capacity;148 the time necessary for the recipient to acquire
appropriate education, training, or employment;"9 the health and age
of the parties; and their obligations to support or care for dependent
children.'50 Notably, also included among these illustrative' factors
144. See note 142, supra.
145. See note 143, supra.
146. Other factors besides those listed in the text are also to be considered by the
trial judge. See note 143, supra.
147. The jurisprudence interpreting article 160 before its amendment had taken
into consideration the liquidity of the claimant wife's assets in determining whether
she had sufficient means for her support. See Frederic v. Frederic, 302 So. 2d 903 (La.
1974); Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 47 So. 2d 32 (1950); Boisfontaine v. Boisfontaine, 357
So. 2d 90 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978). See generally The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Persons, 37 LA. L. REV. 305, 307-13 (1976). But see
Sonfield v. Sonfield, No. 10,675 (La. App. 4th Cir. Oct. 4, 1979). In Sonfield, the fourth
circuit held that ownership by claimant wife of an expensive New Orleans Garden Dis-
trict home, which she bought after divorce, and from which over $90,000 could be
realized by the wife from sale, was "sufficient means for her support," despite the non-
liquid nature of the asset. Now, under article 160 as amended, liquidity of both
spouses' assets is a factor to be considered by the trial judge before making an award.
See note 143, supra.
148. See La Hood v. La Hood, 340 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Gravel v.
Gravel, 331 So. 2d 580 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976). In both cases, a mother with custody of
small children was said to be justified in failing to seek employment so that she could
remain home to care for the children. However, in Ward v. Ward, 339 So. 2d 839 (La.
1976), and Favrot v. Barnes, 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976), the supreme court held that a
wife need not supply a justifiable reason to refrain from working. She was entitled to
alimony by virtue of the husband's article 120 obligation of support in spite of her
refusal to work.
149. See Gravel v. Gravel, 331 So. 2d 580 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) (wife, who was
registered nurse, enrolled as a full-time student in graduate school seeking a Masters
Degree in Nursing Education, held not required to seek employment and discontinue
her graduate course).
150. See La Hood v. La Hood, 340 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Ducote v.
Ducote, 339 So. 2d 835 (La. 1976); Cox v. Cox, 199 So. 2d 365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
151. The Act makes it clear that these factors are illustrative by directing the
judge to consider "any other circumstances that the court deems relevant." 1979 La.
Acts, No. 72, amending LA. CIV. CODE art. 160.
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is the earning capacity of both spouses, a legislative overruling of
prior jurisprudence which had held that the wife's potential earning
capacity was not a proper basis for refusing to award alimony. In
two 1976 cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the wife had
no legal duty to earn her own livelihood. 52 The court interpreted the
phrase "sufficient means for her support" in article 160 as not en-
compassing earning capacity.15 As amended, the article, though it still
includes that phrase, specifically requires the trial judge to consider
the claimant's "earning capability" ' 4 in determining if he or she is enti-
tled to alimony. 55 Though this consideration is to be made "in light of all
other circumstances,""' 6 it appears likely that failure of a claimant
spouse to work, without a justifiable reason to refrain from doing so,
will result in a denial of alimony.
Though the legislature made only minor textual changes in arti-
cle 148,1" the amendment of that article also may have worked a
change in the law, due to a problem that the legislature apparently
had not anticipated."' Under the jurisprudence interpreting article
152. Favrot v. Barnes, 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976); Ward v. Ward, 339 So. 2d 839 (La.
1976).
153. The court noted in Ward that article 160 alimony was limited to basic necessi-
ties of life. 339 So. 2d at 842. Thus, a wife who refused to work, and received alimony
nonetheless, would hardly be enjoying an elegant lifestyle.
154. "Earning capacity" as a factor to be considered in determining the amount of
alimony is mentioned twice in amended article 160. The earning capacity of both
spouses is to be considered by the trial judge. Likewise, the effect which custody of
the children of the marriage has upon the earning capacity of the spouse with custody
is also to be considered by the trial judge. See note 143, supra. It is not clear whether
or not the terms "earning capacity" and "earning capability" are synonymous.
The maximum amount of alimony that may be awarded under article 160 is still
limited to one-third of the paying spouse's income. See notes 141 & 143, supra. This
limitation, combined with the termination upon divorce of the obligation of support,
suggests that a spouse might avoid alimony payments by refusing to work. However,
after amendment, article 160 directs the trial judge to consider the earning capacities
of both spouses. Thus, an argument that a spouse might avoid paying alimony by
refusing to work apparently would fail.
155. See note 143, supra.
156. 1979 La. Acts, No. 72, amending LA. CIV. CODE art. 160.
157. See text at note 144, supra.
158. That the legislation was not drafted as carefully as it should have been is illus-
trated by the preamble to Act 72, which says that the amendments to articles 148 and
160 were "to permit either spouse who is not at fault and who is in need to obtain ali-
mony pending suit for separation or divorce or alimony after divorce .... (Emphasis
added.) However, pending a judgment, the issue of fault has not yet been adjudicated;
thus, it cannot be taken into consideration though alimony pendente lite is due from
the date of filing -uit. Moreover, it is doubtful that fault should play a role in the
awarding of alimony pendente lite. Though the source of the obligation to pay alimony
to the claimant spouse is no longer clear, historically the obligation was based on the
husband's duty to support his wife. While Orr forbids the enforcement of such obliga-
tions limited to one sex, an obligation to support still remains. See text at notes 160-63,
infra.
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148 prior to amendment, a wife did not need to work in order to be
eligible to receive alimony pendente lite.'59 Previously, however, the
source of the husband's obligation to support the wife with alimony
pendente lite had been founded upon article 120, which provides
that the husband is obliged to furnish the wife with "whatever is re-
quired for the convenience of life." ' While article 120 has not been
amended, Orr has in effect rendered unenforceable this non-recip-
rocal obligation of support by the husband. 1
Amended article 148 requires a spouse, not just the husband, to
support the other spouse, if that other spouse has insufficient in-
come for maintenance. 2 In light of the amendment to article 148,
the question becomes: What is the source of the obligation to pay
alimony pendente lite? Article 119 provides an obligation of mutual
support between the spouses. 3 However, if article 119 is deter-
mined to be the source of the obligation to pay alimony pendente
lite, it would seem that the needy spouse could not refuse to work
and still be entitled to alimony pendente lite because the obligation
of support is mutual.
Moreover, the obligation imposed by article 119 has been inter-
preted to be less onerous than that imposed by article 120; only the
necessities of life are required to be provided to a spouse under arti-
cle 119, while the conveniences of life had to be provided by the hus-
band under article 120."6 Thus, when article 120 served as the
159. See Bilello v. Bilello, 240 La. 158, 121 So. 2d 728 (1960); Best v. Best, 337 So.
2d 672, 674 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Gravel v. Gravel, 331 So. 2d 580 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976).
160. LA. CIv. CODE art. 120 provides: "The wife is bound to live with her husband
and to follow him wherever he chooses to reside; the husband is obliged to receive her
and to furnish her with whatever is required for the convenience of life, in proportion
to his means and conditions."
161. See note 140, supra. However, an analysis similar to that of Justice Dennis in
Loyacano might be adopted in order to extend the article 120 obligation of support to
the wife. See Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978) (on original hearing).
162. See note 142, supra.
163. LA. CIv. CODE art. 119 provides: "The husbhnd and wife owe to each other
mutually, fidelity, support and assistance."
164. Professor Robert Pascal has said:
Article 120 of the Civil Code states two obligations as correlatives: that of the
wife to live with her husband wherever he chooses to reside, and that of the hus-
band to receive her and to furnish her with whatever is required for the con-
veniences of life, in proportion to his means and condition. This special obligation
of the husband, then, it is to be noted, is greater than the simple obligation for
support provided for by Article 119 ....
R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE § 5.6 (1975) (emphasis in original). Pro-
fessor Pascal, basing his view of article 119 on his interpretation of the word "support"
used in that article, has said that "[slupport refers to whatever is necessary for liv-
ing-traditionally food, shelter, and clothing." Id at § 5.4.
As the court in Ward noted, article 160 alimony is limited to life's basic necessities.
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source of the obligation, the courts had held that a wife had to 'be
maintained "in the style and under the conditions to which she is ac-
customed by reason of her husband's means and position in the com-
munity."'' 5 If article 119 is now the source of the obligation to pay
alimony pendente lite, a needy spouse is entitled only to the necessi-
ties of life.
Yet there is reason to believe that the legislature did not intend
article 119 to be the source of the obligation. Act 72 gives the trial
judge discretion in determining whether a needy spouse is entitled
to alimony pendente lite.' If the obligation is based on article 119,
the trial judge should not have the discretion to ignore the mutual
obligation of support mandated by that article.
Moreover, it can be inferred from the scant legislative history
available that the legislature intended to continue in force most of
the distinctions between alimony pendente lite and permanent ali-
mony. A House proposed bill contained an almost identical set of fac-
tors that the trial judge was to consider before exercising his discretion
to allow or not to allow alimony in both article 148 and article 160. The
entitlement and amount of alimony before and after divorce were to be
conditioned'on a number of factors, including the earning capacity of
both spouses."7 But this set of factors was incorporated only into the
final version of article 160."'8
Since the legislature did not enact the proposed version of arti-
cle 148 which would have required the trial judge to consider the
earning capacity of the claimant spouse, as well as of the paying
spouse, it might be inferred that the former is not to be taken into
consideration in determining the entitlement to, or amount of,
alimony pendente lite. It is possible that the legislature intended
For a discussion of these "basic necessities" in conjunction with alimony reciprocally
owed by ascendants to descendants, see the section entitled "Alimony 'Between
Ascendants and Descendants."
165. Kimble v. Kimble, 305 So. 2d 700, 702 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
166. "[Tlhe judge may allow the claimant spouse ... a sum for that spouse's sup-
port ...." LA. CIV. CODE art. 148, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 72 (emphasis
added). Revised Statutes 1:3 provides that as to statutory construction, "the word
'shall' is mandatory and the word 'may' is permissive."
167. Representative Simoneaux, who co-sponsored Senate Bill 59, which became
Act 72, also introduced House Bill 901, which contained proposed amendments to arti-
cles 148 and 160. Proposed article 148 provided: "In determining the entitlement and
amount of alimony before divorce, the court shall consider the income and assets of the
spouses; the liquidity of such assets ... ; the standard of living and the earning capac-
ity of the spouses, including their education, training, work experience, marketability
of skills ...." La. H.B. 901, proposed LA. CIv. CODE art. 148, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
168. Compare LA. Civ. CODE art. 160, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 72, with
LA. CIV. CODE art. 148, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 72.
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that the jurisprudential rule holding that the wife need not work to
be entitled to alimony pendente lite' 9 should be extended to all
needy spouses, while at the same time extending the jurisprudential
rule that the trial court shall consider the earning capacity of the
husband17 ° to the paying spouse. If such was the legislative intent,
the scheme will not work because, should both spouses refuse to
seek employment, there is no way to determine who is to be the
paying spouse or' the claimant spouse. These jurisprudential rules
cannot be extended because they were the logical consequence of
the non-reciprocal obligation of support owed by the husband to the
wife.
Similarly, because the amendments to article 148 made no refer-
ence to the standard by which the amount of alimony pendente lite
is to be determined,17" ' it might be inferred that the legislature in-
tended to expand the rule that a claimant wife be maintained "in the
style to which she is accustomed"' 72 to claimant husbands as well. If
this were the intention, it is likely the legislature has failed to
achieve its purpose. Since the "in the style to which she is accus-
tomed" standard was based on the article 120 obligation of the hus-
band to furnish the wife with the conveniences of life, and since Orr
has rendered this non-reciprocal obligation unenforceable, the courts
will be forced to look elsewhere for the standard by which to deter-
mine the amount of alimony pendente lite due a needy spouse.
In light of the failure of the legislature to recognize the need for
a new source for the obligation to pay alimony pendente lite, it re-
mains for the courts to shape the contours of amended article 148.
Whether the change of the word "shall" to "may" gives the trial
judge unbridled discretion is one question the appellate courts will
have to answer. Even more importantly, the courts must determine
what "support" a needy spouse is entitled to under amended article
148, a determination which can no longer depend on the non-recip-
rocal obligation of article 120.
169. See the cases cited in note 159, supra.
170. The -means of the husband under article 148 have been held to include his
property and earning capacity. See Johnson v. Johnson, 317 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1975).
171. See note 142, supra.
172. See Kimble v. Kimble, 305 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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